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ABSTRACT 
 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) are both mega-regional trade initiatives in the Asia-Pacific that began in the late 
2000s. Both are currently still under negotiation, and once concluded, will potentially shape the 
future of economic integration in the region. This paper seeks to explain why two overlapping yet 
diverging mega-regional trade deals emerged in the same region at around the same time.  The paper 
posits that there is a direct relationship between the development of the TPP and that of the RCEP. 
Hence, it seeks to find a theory that best explains the interactive progress of the two “tracks”. By 
tracing the historical evolution of both agreements, comparing their key features, and studying the 
motivations and actions of the main players participating in either or both agreements, the author 
finds that firstly, there is indeed a competitive and mutually stimulating relationship between the 
TPP and the RCEP. Secondly, the theory that best explains the dynamics between the two proposals 
is “competitive regionalism”. This recently developed theory not only integrates realist and liberal 
arguments, but also takes into consideration domestic interests in influencing the mega-regional 
trade negotiations. Hence, it best accounts for the authors’ observations on the sequencing and 
patterns of the emerging regional trade arrangements, as well as the motivations and actions of 
participating states. This paper contributes to the analytical and theoretical literature on economic 
regionalism in general, and offers insights on the current state of Asia-Pacific economic integration.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Mega-regional Trade Agreements: TPP and RCEP  
 
In March 2010, the first round of negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) began 
in Melbourne, Australia among nine countries – Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam. The TPP has been called an “ambitious, twenty-
first century trade agreement”1 with extensive regulatory alignment in “next generation” trade areas 
such as labour law, environmental protection and intellectual property rights.2 Currently, there are 12 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries involved in the TPP talks (known as the 
“TPP12”): the nine countries mentioned above, as well as Canada, Mexico and Japan. Together, 
these countries account for 40% of world GDP and a third of global trade. 3 As such, the TPP, if 
successfully concluded, would bring about an estimated trade volume of US$10.19 trillion and a 
nominal GDP of US$19.76 trillion, making it the biggest trade agreement in history.4  
 
At the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit held in Cambodia in 
November 2012, negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) were 
formally launched among the ten members of the ASEAN and the six states that had existing free 
trade agreements (FTAs) with ASEAN, namely Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and 
New Zealand.5  The RCEP is envisioned to be a comprehensive free trade agreement that will 
broaden and deepen current FTAs among these 16 countries (also known as the “ASEAN+6”). The 
16 RCEP countries account for almost half of the world’s population, nearly 30% of global GDP 
and over a quarter of world exports.6 If negotiations are successful, the total trade volume and GDP 
of the trading bloc is expected to reach US$10.13 trillion and US$19.76 trillion respectively.7  
                                                 
1 “The United States in the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/united-states-trans-pacific-partnership. 
2 Mark Thomson, “Trade partnership competition: TPP vs. RCEP,” The Strategist - The Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
Blog, 16 April 16 2013, accessed 7 October 2014, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/trade-partnership-competition-tpp-
vs-rcep/  
3 Joshua Meltzer, “The TPP, the Environment and Climate Change,” in Trade Liberalisation and International Co-operation: A 
Legal Analysis of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ed. Tania Voon (Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014), 
207-230 
4 Inkyo Cheong and Jose Tongzon. "Comparing the Economic Impact of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership." Asian Economic Papers 12 (2013): 146.  
5 The ten member states of ASEAN are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam.  
6 “Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership negotiations”, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
accessed 12 December 2014, http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/rcep/ 
7 Cheong and Tongzon, 146. 
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 Asia-Pacific trade is a logical setting for new agreements due to its scale and dynamism. Of 
the world’s US$14 trillion trade in 2010, US$9 trillion involve APEC economies (a useful, though 
synthetic definition of the region), and region’s interest in formal linkages is clearly rising.8 The 
aforementioned mega-regional free trade deals – the RCEP and the TPP – have become the main 
focal points for economic relations in the Asia-Pacific (and even the world) because of their sheer 
economic impact, geopolitical implications, and potential influence on the global trading system. 
One key question that has emerged in the scholarly debate and popular media is whether the two 
potential regional FTA trading blocs would interfere with one another, or if they are able to coexist 
with, and even merge with, one another.  
 
Since China is excluded from the TPP, and the US from the RCEP, many scholars and 
media commentators have portrayed the TPP and the RCEP as competing proposals driven by the 
US and China respectively. 9 Some scholars go as far as to claim that the US-led TPP aims to contain 
the growing influence and power of China in the Asia-Pacific region.10 Others argue that the RCEP 
is China’s response to the TPP,11, and warn that the RCEP can slow down, or even undermine, the 
TPP negotiations, and vice-versa.12  
 
Other scholars have argued that competition between the RCEP and the TPP is 
constructive. For example, Petri and Plummer view the two regional trade agreements as examples 
of “competitive liberalization” – they stimulate each other’s progress.13 They argue that RCEP and 
                                                 
8 Before 2000, there were only four major FTAs among APEC economies. In 2014, there are more than 30, with more 
in the works.  
9 Some examples of media commentators include: Jagdish Bhagwati, “America’s Threat to Trans-Pacific Trade,” Project 
Syndicate, 30 December 2011, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/america-s-threat-to-trans-pacific-trade; 
and Beginda Pakpahan, “Will RCEP compete with the TPP?”, East Asia Forum, 28 November 2012, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/11/28/will-rcep-compete-with-the-tpp/.  
10 Jane Kelsey, “US-China Relations and the Geopolitics of the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA),” Global 
Research, 11 November 2013, http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-china-relations-and-the-geopolitics-of-the-trans-pacific-
partnership-agreement-tppa/5357504 
11 Shintaro Hamanka. “TPP vs. RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting.” Journal of East Asian Economic 
Integration 18 (2014): 163-186.  
12  Enda Curran, "Asia Leaders Push Regional Trade Pact", The Wall Street Journal, 19 November 2012, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323622904578128650479355368 
13 Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer, “ASEAN Centrality, the RCEP, and the TPP”, East-West Center Policy Studies 
69 (2013) 
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TPP need not be mutually exclusive. Rather, mutually reinforcing competitive liberalization will 
produce high quality and comprehensive integration in the Asia-Pacific.14  
 
The two frameworks differ in terms of their specific objectives, issue coverage, membership 
and accession rules, but they do share the common agenda of trade liberalization and economic 
integration in the Asia-Pacific. As such, most scholars view the RCEP and the TPP as building 
blocks to the Free Trade Agreement of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), which was first mooted by the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 2006. Currently, APEC countries, including China 
and the US, agree that the RCEP and the TPP are both “possible pathways” to the FTAAP. 15   
 
 But why did two different frameworks for regional economic integration – the TPP and the 
RCEP - emerge in the Asia-Pacific at around the same time? What factors, at the global, regional and 
domestic level, have influenced the formation and evolution of these agreements with differing 
visions for economic regionalism? 16  Is there an inherent relationship between the development 
trajectories of these two mega-regional FTAs; and if so, what is this the nature of their interaction? 
Finally, to what extent can existing theories explain the close timing in the launch of these two 
frameworks as well as the way in which their respective negotiations have progressed thus far?  
 
1.2. Structure and Methodology  
 
 As aforementioned, there are fundamental differences but also overlaps in the agenda, 
prospective content and membership of the TPP and the RCEP. Therefore, this thesis aims to 
answer the question: why is it that two overlapping yet diverging mega-regional trade agreements 
have emerged in the same region (i.e. the Asia-Pacific) in the first decade of the 21st century? In 
other words, this paper attempts to explain the interlinked development of the RCEP and the TPP 
within a theoretical framework. This paper posits there is a direct competitive relationship between 
                                                 
14 Chia Siow Yue, “The Emerging Regional Economic Integration Architecture in East Asia.” Asian Economic Papers 12 
(2013): 1-37.  
15 APEC, “2014 Leader’s Declarations: Annex A – The Beijing Roadmap for APEC’s Contribution of the Realization of 
the FTAAP”, accessed 13 February 2015, http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders 
Declarations/2014/2014_aelm/2014_aelm_annexa.aspx 
16 Regionalism is typically defined as a political, top-down process that involves institutionalization. It can be understood 
as a political process in which measures such as economic policy cooperation and regulation are taken as standard.  
Regionalization, on the other hand, is an energetic, bottom-up process based on the economic connections between 
social actors. This means that it is a phenomenon in which economic exchange is regionally concentrated and 
conceptually, it is similar to economic interdependence. 
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the launch and progress of the TPP, and that of the RCEP.  The following sections of the paper will 
first, examine the evidence that leads me to conclude that this hypothesis is correct, and secondly, 
explain the specific factors that have given rise to this competitive dynamic.  
 
After the introduction (section I), the second section of the paper will trace the historical 
origins of the RCEP and the TPP. Specifically, it examines how each initiative came about as a result 
of broad global and regional conditions, and how it evolved to its current state. This section will be 
largely based on a review of scholarly works documenting the trade trends and the recent history of 
economic regionalism in the Asia-Pacific. 
 
The third section highlights the similarities and differences in the agenda, substantive 
content, membership and accession rules of the two agreements, as well as the dynamic interaction 
between the negotiating processes of the two “tracks”. As the actual texts of the TPP and RCEP 
have not been publicly released (save for three draft chapters of the TPP published on Wikileaks), 
this section will rely mostly on scholarly works (i.e. books, journal publications, working papers and 
reports,), current news articles (including academic commentary), and official statements by the 
participating states to shed light on the nuts and bolts of these two proposals.  
 
 The fourth section elaborates upon the motivations and actions of the key negotiating 
parties, which are crucial for understanding why the two agreements emerged and developed in their 
particular ways. Given the large number of countries involved in the TPP and the RCEP, and their 
power asymmetries, this thesis will focus on the most economically and politically important players, 
namely the US, China, Japan and ASEAN. Again, this section will draw largely upon the research 
material used in the previous section to explain the strategic motivations and behaviour of the 
selected countries.  
 
The fifth section presents existing theories that explain regionalism in the Asia-Pacific and 
more specifically, the coinciding emergence of the TPP and the RCEP. This section demonstrates 
the usefulness and limitations of the aforementioned theories in explaining the development of the 
TPP and/or the RCEP, by comparing the claims of these theories with the actual development of 
both agreements. A strong theory should be able to explain the formation of more than one 
agreement and to illuminate the process by which the agreements are being negotiated.  
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Finally, the sixth section will integrate the key findings from the previous sections and 
identify possible areas for future research.  
 
1.3. Key Findings  
  
 Several theoretical arguments have been advanced to explain the emergence of the RCEP 
and the TPP. Systemic-level arguments broadly fall into two schools of thought: realist and liberal. 
The realists generally interpret the RCEP and the TPP as proxies for great power competition 
between the US and China, with each great power seeking to check the (interlinked) regional 
influence and economic dominance of the other by leading a mega-regional trade deal that excludes 
the other (at least in the short term). Liberals, on the other hand, broadly view the RCEP and the 
TPP as regional institutions that developed from common challenges and interests shared by 
countries in the Asia-Pacific. These mega-regional trade agreements facilitate regional cooperation 
and integration among states that have high and increasing levels of economic interdependence. 
Besides these systemic-level theories, there are also domestic-level theories that emphasize the role 
of domestic interest groups in lobbying for trade-diverting FTAs and the chain reaction that these 
FTAs trigger among non-member producers.17 Finally, there are integrative theories that draw from 
both the liberal and realist perspectives.  
 
This paper finds “competitive regionalism”, which integrates the realist and liberal schools of 
thought, best explains the development and interaction of the RCEP and the TPP. Competitive 
regionalism (also known as “competitive diffusion”) is a theory of FTA diffusion developed by 
Katada and Solis in 2009, and applied specifically to explain the proliferation of bilateral and 
plurilateral FTAs in the Asia-Pacific since the late 1990s.18 I find competitive regionalism to be the 
most useful theory because it allows me to better account for the observations I have made about 
the motives of participating states as well as the sequencing and patterns of the emerging regional 
trade arrangements. While realism and liberalism contribute to most of the existing theoretical 
literature on FTAs, competitive regionalism draws from both the realist and liberal (institutional) 
perspectives. Moreover, it takes into consideration domestic influences and the role of government 
                                                 
17  The chain reaction include subsequent FTA enlargement and the negotiation of alternative trade blocs, as 
disadvantaged non-member producers seek to minimize the trade and investment diversion caused by previous FTAs.  
18 Competitive Regionalism: Explaining the Diffusion of FTAs in the Pacific Rim, ed., Saori N. Katada, Mireya Solís and Barbara 
Stallings (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 
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leadership in explaining not just the genesis of the TPP and RCEP, but also the competitive and 
mutually stimulating dynamics between them.  
 
1.4. Significance of this paper 
 
According to the World Economic Forum, mega-regional trade agreements are the “most 
important topic in the international trade scenario today.”19 Mega-regional trade agreements are deep 
integration partnerships in the form of regional trade agreements between countries or regions with 
a major share of world trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) and in which two or more of the 
parties are in a paramount driver position, or serve as hubs, in global value chains (i.e. the US, the 
EU, Japan, China). Beyond market access, the emphasis of this type of partnership is on regulatory 
compatibility and a rules basket aimed at harmonizing differences in investment and business 
climates. The World Economic Forum has stated that both the RCEP and TPP fall under the 
category of mega-regional trade agreements.20 
 
The TPP and the RCEP are worth studying because of their current relevance (both 
agreements are still being negotiated as of 30 March 2015) and massive potential economic impact. 
Both agreements have the potential to shape the regional economic architecture of the Asia-Pacific, 
and thus constitute a critical juncture in Asia-Pacific regionalism. Some scholars see them as “game-
changers” in the global trading system,21 in the sense that their negotiations are potentially redefining 
the trade rules of the 21st century.22   
 
Both the RCEP and the TPP are relatively new developments; hence the available evidence 
and scholarship that has emerged since the beginning of the TPP negotiations in 2009 and the 
RCEP negotiations in 2013 have been very limited. Most of the literature that focuses on 
regionalism in the Asia-Pacific or East Asia tend to point out the differences between the RCEP and 
TPP, but do not explain the origins and development of the agreements from a theoretical 
standpoint. Analyses that compare the two agreements also tend to speculate about their possible 
                                                 
19 World Economic Forum, “Mega-regional Trade agreements: Game Changers of Costly Distractions for the World 
Trading System?”, Global Agenda Council on Trade & Foreign Direct Investment, July 2014, 1.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Bryan Mercurio, "The TransPacific Partnership: Suddenly a ‘Game Changer’." The World Economy 37 (2014): 1558-
1574. 
22 Peter A. Petri, “The new mega-regionals: the TPP, RCEP and beyond,” Asia Pathways (Blog of the Asian Development 
Bank), 22 May 2014, http://www.asiapathways-adbi.org/2014/05/the-new-mega-regionals-the-tpp-rcep-and-beyond/ 
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outcomes, advocate one or the other, or point out their incompatibility or complementarity, but do 
not say much about the inter-related evolution of the two frameworks.  
 
This paper will contribute to the growing literature on economic regionalism and the 
proliferation of free-trade agreements by refining existing theoretical arguments to explain the 
differences in the development of the RCEP and the TPP. More broadly, this paper aims to offer 
insight on the current state of Asia-Pacific economic integration and the future of economic 
architecture in the region.   
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE TPP AND THE RCEP  
 
 The origins of the TPP and the RCEP deserve more attention because the historical context 
sheds light on the broader trends and events that have culminated in these regional trade 
frameworks. Some of these factors continue to shape the many trade agreements being negotiated in 
the Asia-Pacific region today. Understanding the events and developments that have influenced the 
birth and growth of the TPP and the RCEP is also crucial to understanding the current state and the 
future prospects of both mega-regional agreements. This section will first give an overview of the 
international and regional conditions that led to the proliferation of FTAs in the Asia-Pacific, and 
subsequently, the search for a region-wide FTA in East Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific region. 
The intra-regional and extra-regional dynamics discussed below also form the backdrop for the 
genesis of the RCEP and the TPP.  
 
2.1. The Proliferation of FTAs in the Asia-Pacific23 
 
 In the past two decades, the trade system in the Asia-Pacific region has been rapidly 
transformed. Prior to the 2000s, trade liberalization had largely occurred under the auspices of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), a multilateral body that enforces a set of binding trade rules 
upon all its members. However, during the last 15 years or so, a number of governments in the Asia-
Pacific have turned towards FTAs – bilateral and plurilateral (i.e. involving more than two states) 
agreements that go beyond WTO rules to preferentially reduce barriers to trade between signatory 
countries. In 2000, there were only three trade agreements in force in the Asia-Pacific, but by 2014, 
the number of regional trade agreements reported to the WTO rose to 40.24 Moreover, if non-WTO 
notified and under-negotiation agreements are included, the count of FTA initiatives among Asia-
Pacific states rises to 71.25 As a result, the region has become one of the most active sites for FTA 
negotiations globally.26  
 
                                                 
23 For the purposes of this paper, the Asia-Pacific is defined as the combined membership of the East Asian Summit 
(EAS) and the APEC – the ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, the US, 
Russia, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Taiwan, Canada and Chile.“  
24  World Trade Organisation (WTO), Regional Trade Agreements Database (2014), accessed 7 August 2014, 
http://www. wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm,  
25 Asian Development Bank (ADB) Asian Regional Integration Centre FTA Database (2014), accessed 8 August 2014, 
http://aric.adb.org/FTAbyCountryAll.php  
26 Christopher Dent, “Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific a Decade On: Evaluating the Past, Looking to the 
Future.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 10 (2010): 201–245. 
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2.1.1. Main factors that led to the rise of FTAs in the Asia-Pacific  
 
 Several global, regional and domestic factors combined to propel this regional shift from 
multilateralism towards bilateral and (sub)regional FTAs during the 2000s. Firstly, many 
governments have become frustrated at the lack of progress in the Doha Round of the WTO 
negotiations, and have turned to bilateral and plurilateral FTAs as an alternate strategy for trade 
liberalization.27 . Secondly, several developed countries in the Asia-Pacific are interested in so-called 
“WTO Plus” trade issues, such as investment, services and intellectual property, and have used 
FTAs as a means to advance trade liberalization in these areas.28 Third, others countries have been 
defensively signing FTAs in order to neutralize disadvantages associated with being excluded from the 
web of FTAs spreading across the region. The widely influential “domino effect” theory argues that 
countries join or negotiate countervailing FTAs to neutralise trade diversion effects.29 Finally, some 
governments have used FTAs for geopolitical rather than purely economic purposes: to “reward” 
security partners,30 to signal diplomatic intentions,31 and to pursue non-trade forms of economic 
cooperation (such as resource security arrangements).32 (The specific FTA motivations of the main 
players in the TPP and RCEP will be examined in detail in section IV.) The consequence of FTA 
proliferation is that the trade system in the Asia-Pacific is no longer flat and multilateral, but 
dominated by a complex web of overlapping bilateral agreements with markedly different templates 
and objectives.  
 
2.1.2. Problems with the spread of FTAs in the Asia-Pacific 
 
However, the spread of FTAs posed two interrelated problems for progress towards trade 
integration in the Asia-Pacific. Firstly, the “quality” of most FTAs in the region was low because 
they were between countries with relatively low trade volume and because they typically have narrow 
coverage, with important (but domestically sensitive) sectors excluded, such as agriculture and 
                                                 
27 B. Desker, “In Defence of FTAs: From Purity to Pragmatism in East Asia.” The Pacific Review 17 (2014): 3–26.  
28 S. Thangavelu, and M. Toh, “Bilateral ‘WTO Plus’ Free Trade Agreements: The WTO Trade Policy Review of 
Singapore 2004.” World Economy 28 (2005): 1211–1228. 
29 Richard E. Baldwin, “Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free 
Trade.” World Economy 29 (2006): 1451–1518. 
30 R.A. Higgott, “US Foreign Policy and the ‘Securitisation’ of Economic Globalisation”, International Politics 41 (2004): 
147–175. 
31 Ann Capling, “Preferential Trade Agreements as Instruments of Foreign Policy: An Australia-Japan Free Trade 
Agreement and its Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region”, The Pacific Review 21 (2008): 27–43. 
32 J.D. Wilson, “Resource Security: A New Motivation for Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific Region”, The Pacific 
Review 25 (2012): 429–453. 
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financial services.33 Agreements involving China and ASEAN members also rarely address any of 
the WTO Plus issues – such as investment, intellectual property and technical barriers to trade – in a 
substantive way that improves upon or extends existing WTO rules.34  As a result, many analysts 
have argued that FTAs in the Asia-Pacific have failed to live up to their promise of advancing either 
trade liberalization, or broader forms of regional economic cooperation, in a meaningful way.35  
 
 A second challenge posed by the regional FTAs is the so-called “noodle bowl” (or “spaghetti 
bowl”) problem. Unlike multilateral trade through the WTO (which enforces a single and consistent 
set of trade rules for all members states), bilateral and pluriteral FTAs vary widely in their content. 
Each agreement includes (and excludes) different sectors, involves different commitments for tariff 
reduction, and creates different rules for technical standards, rules of origin, investment protection, 
etc. These inconsistencies deeply complicate the regional trading system, as each country has a 
different set of regulations and commitments for each of its FTA partners. The result has been the 
emergence of a complex patchwork of incommensurate and overlapping FTAs in the region, which 
is metaphorically compared to a tangled bowl of noodles. 36  The concern is that this tangle 
undermines the cohesiveness of both the global and regional trade system, imposes unnecessary 
transaction costs on businesses operating across regional economies, and might even lead to the 
emergence of competing trade blocs.37  
 
Recognition of such concerns by Asia-Pacific countries has resulted in intergovernmental 
discussions on establishing an FTA that encompasses the entire Asia-Pacific region (i.e. APEC 
members), and more exclusively, among East Asian countries.38 Generally, the region-wide FTA 
                                                 
33 John Ravenhill, “The Move to Preferential Trade on the Western Pacific Rim: Some Initial Conclusions,” Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 62 (2008): 129–150. 
34  Ann Capling and Jonh Ravenhill, “Multilateralising Regionalism: What Role for the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement?” The Pacific Review 24 (2011): 553–575. 
35 Ann Capling,“Australia’s Trade Policy Dilemmas”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 62 (2008): 
229–244; Dent, “Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific a Decade On”; Wilson, “Resource Security: A New 
Motivation for Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific Region.”  
36 Richard E. Baldwin, “Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism.” ADB Working Paper 
Series on Regional Economic Integration, No. 7. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2007.  
37 Warwick Commission, “The Multilateral Trade Regime: Which Way Forward?” Coventry: University of Warwick 
(2007), accessed 12 March 2015, http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission/worldtrade/report/; World 
Trade Organisation, “World Trade Report 2011: The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements – From Co-existence to 
Coherence”, Geneva: World Trade Organisation (2011), accessed 12 March 2015, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr11_e.htm. 
38 In this paper, “East Asia” is defined as to the ten countries of ASEAN, Taiwan, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia 
and New Zealand. East Asia can be seen as a smaller region encompassed within the wider Asia-Pacific region. 
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approach is regarded as superior to plurilateral and bilateral approaches, in terms of the economic 
and political benefits it generates.39 Various economic simulation studies show that mega-regional 
FTAs, such as the TPP and RCEP, will result in more economic benefits than smaller plurilateral 
and bilateral FTAs for all countries involved.40  
 
2.2. The search for a region-wide FTA: East Asia vs. Trans-Pacific 
 
The pursuit of regional economic integration in the region under discussion has featured two 
distinct concepts of regionalism: the East Asia track and the trans-Pacific track.41 This sub-section will 
demonstrate that the TPP and RCEP are new iterations of the trans-Pacific track and the East Asia 
track respectively, and that these two tracks have influenced each other since the 1990s.  
 
1.2.1 The Trans-Pacific Track: APEC  
 
The idea of trans-Pacific regionalism has an even longer history than East Asian regionalism. 
The concept of trans-Pacific economic integration dates back to the 1960s to proposals developed in 
the Pacific Trade and Development forum (PAFTAD) and eventually the quasi-governmental 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), founded in 1980.42 PECC’s regional community-
building efforts led to the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1990 
among 12 Asia-Pacific countries. 43 The primary goal of APEC is to support sustainable economic 
growth and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, mainly by championing free and open trade and 
investment, promoting and accelerating regional economic integration, and encouraging economic 
and technical cooperation.44 In 1994, APEC members convening in the Indonesian city of Bogor set 
                                                 
39 Economically, regional FTAs are expected to produce larger static welfare effects from trade creation, less trade 
diversion, economies of scale and better utilization of economic resources. Deeper economic integration also tends to 
reduce geopolitical tensions and conflicts as the countries involved would be more economically interdependent. Chia 
Siow Yue. "The Emerging Regional Economic Integration Architecture in East Asia", 15-16.  
40 Kawai, Masahiro, and Ganeshan Wignaraja, “ASEAN+ 3 or ASEAN+ 6: Which way forward?” ADB Institute 
Discussion Papers, No. 77 (2007); Petri, Peter A., Michael G. Plummer, and Fan Zhai. "ASEAN Economic Community: 
A General Equilibrium Analysis*." Asian Economic Journal 26 (2012): 93-118. 
41 Robert Scollay, "APEC's Regional Economic Integration Agenda and the Evolution of Economic Integration in the 
Asia-Pacific Region." APEC Study Series (2012): 9. 
42 The PECC is a network of member committees composed of individuals and institutions dedicated to promoting 
cooperation across the Asia-Pacific region.  
43 APEC now comprises 21 member economies: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, People's Republic of 
China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, 
Peru, Republic of the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. 
44  APEC, “APEC Mission Statement”, accessed 2 February 2015, http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-
APEC/Mission-Statement.aspx,  
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the goal of free trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region (by 2010 for developed countries and 
by 2020 for developing countries), by further reducing barriers to trade and investment and by 
promoting free flow of goods, services and capital.  These targets became known as the Bogor 
Goals, and would remain as the aspirational force behind APEC’s regional economic integration 
agenda till today.  
 
However, by the 2000s, APEC’s pursuit of the 1994 Bogor Goals had lost momentum in the 
face of rising East Asian regionalism and the loss of credibility resulting from the failure of APEC’s 
Early Voluntary Sector Liberalization (EVSL) initiative in 1998.45 The launch of the WTO’s Doha 
Round negotiations, and the beginning of the rapid spread of FTAs within East Asia, seemed to 
render APEC’s vision of trans-Pacific integration irrelevant. The next sub-section examines the 
factors that contributed to the development of FTAs in East Asia, and the search for a East Asia-
wide FTA.  
 
1.2.2 The East Asia Track  
 
Proliferation of FTAs in East Asia  
 
Up till the late 1990s, regional integration in East Asia was largely de facto, stimulated by the 
growing web of production networks developed by mostly Japanese firms and multi-national 
corporations.46 It was only after the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis that most East Asian countries 
began emphasizing formal economic cooperation and integration mechanisms – in other words, 
using FTAs as a trade policy instrument. Now, East Asia is at the forefront of global FTA activity.47 
The number of concluded FTAs (bilateral and plurilateral) among East Asian countries increased 
from two in 2000 to thirty in 2013 (as of April 2013).48   
  
                                                 
45 The EVSL was an initiative sponsored mainly by the US that aimed to liberalize identified sectors. However, due to 
strong opposition from other APEC members, especially Japan, with regards to comprehensive liberalization of sensitive 
sectors like agriculture, the EVSL negotiations reached a stalemate in 1998. The failure of the EVSL initiative was a 
major setback for Asia-Pacific economic integration, and the APEC-centered process lost steam in the late 1990s up till 
the early 2000s. 
46 Françoise Nicolas, "De facto and de jure regional economic integration in East Asia: how do they interact." The 
Singapore Economic Review 55 (2010): 7-25. 
47 Roberto V. Fiorentino, Jo-Ann Crawford, and Christelle Toqueboeuf, "The landscape of regional trade agreements 
and WTO surveillance.” In Multilateralizing regionalism: Challenges for the global trading system, ed. Richard E. Baldwin and 
Patrick Low (Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press, 2009), 28.  
48 Asian Regional Integration Center (ARIC), FTA Database, accessed 8 February 2015, www.aric.adb.org/fta  
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Table 1. FTAs among countries in the wide East Asia (as of December 2014) 
Name  Effective Date  Name  Effective Date  
Australia-New Zealand  1/1/1983 Japan-Brunei  
ASEAN FTA 1/28/1992 China-New Zealand   
New Zealand-Singapore 1/1/2001 Japan-ASEAN 12/1/2008 
Japan-Singapore 11/30/2002 Japan-Philippines  12/11/2008  
Singapore-Australia 7/28/2003 China-Singapore 1/1/2009 
ASEAN-China 1/1/2004 Japan-Vietnam 10/1/2009 
Thailand-Australia   1/1/2005 ASEAN-Australia/New Zealand 1/1/2010 
Thailand-New Zealand  7/1/2005  ASEAN-India  1/1/2010 
India-Singapore 8/1/2005 India-Korea 1/1/2010 
Korea-Singapore 3/2/2006 Malaysia-New Zealand 8/1/2010 
Japan-Malaysia 7/13/2006 Hong Kong-New Zealand  1/1/2011 
Korea-ASEAN 6/1/2007 India-Malaysia 7/1/2011 
Japan-Thailand  11/1/2007 Japan-India 8/1/2011 
Japan-Indonesia 7/1/2008 Malaysia-Australia 1/1/2013 
  China-Korea  Late 2015  
Source: Author’s compilation from WTO database of FTAs  
 
Besides intra-regional FTAs, many East Asian countries have also entered into cross-regional 
FTAs since the 2000s. East Asian countries were engaged in 124 cross-regional FTAs as of October 
2007. 49  This open pattern of regional integration, termed “permeated regionalism” or “open 
regionalism” is actually embodied by APEC, and explains why there is an interest among some East 
Asian states in pursuing a wider regional FTA (like the TPP) that includes non-Asian APEC 
members. 50   
 
The ASEAN states – both individually and collectively – have been at the centre of the shift 
towards FTAs in the Asia-Pacific. Southeast Asian governments have signed some 19 bilateral FTAs 
                                                 
49 Mireya Solis, and Saori N. Katada, "Introduction: understanding East Asian cross-regionalism: An analytical 
framework", Pacific Affairs 80 (2007): 229-257.  
50 Cross Regional Trade Agreements: Understanding Permeated Regionalism in East Asia, ed. Katada, Saori N., and Mireya Solís 
(New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2008) 
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since 2000, the majority of which are with economic partners in the broader Asia-Pacific region.51 
Since 1993, the ten member states of ASEAN have also been participating in the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) agreement, which established “common effective preferential tariff” between 
0% to 5% for the majority of intra-ASEAN trade. Moreover, ASEAN itself has also become a 
player in regional FTAs through the negotiation of plurilateral “ASEAN-Plus” FTAs between the 
bloc and trade partners outside of Southeast Asia. ASEAN-Plus FTAs were signed with China, 
South Korea, Japan, India, Australia/New Zealand (ASEAN concluded a joint FTA with both 
Australia and New Zealand) in the latter half of the 2000s, and negotiations with the EU are 
currently underway.  
 
Trigger for East Asian regionalism: The Asian financial crisis   
 
Many scholars stress that the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis was the catalyst for more 
purposeful East Asian regionalism52, as East Asian states recognized the need to respond to the 
challenges of increased interdependence, a process that “requires a more structured and binding 
framework for policy coordination”.53 During the crisis, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was 
unable to respond with appropriate measures. The US also adopted a passive stance, making East 
Asian countries realize the necessity of deeper cooperation among themselves.54 Thus the crisis 
directly led to the creation of regional cooperation mechanisms like the ASEAN Plus Three 
(ASEAN+3) process, the Chang Mai Initiative (CMI) and the Asian Bond Market Initiative 
(ABMI).55 
 
China backs the East Asian Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA) 
 
                                                 
51 WTO, Regional Trade Agreements Database (2014), 7 August 2014, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm 
52 Richard Pomfret, Regionalism in East Asia: why has it flourished since 2000 and how far will it go? (Singapore: World Scientific, 
2011)  
53  MacIntyre, Andrew, and Barry Naughton, "The decline of a Japan-led model of the East Asian economy." In 
Remapping East Asia: the construction of a region, ed. John T. Pempel  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 98. 
54 Yoshinobu Yamamoto, "Asia and Regional Integration Theory: Between a Regional Complex and a Regional Society." 
In Regional Integration in East Asia Theoretical and Historical Perspectives, ed. Satoshi Amako, Shunji Matsuoka, and Kenji 
Horiuchi (New York: United Nations University, 2013), 23.  
55 The Chang Mai Initiative (CMI) is a multilateral currency swap arrangement among the ten members of ASEAN, 
China, Japan and South Korea. It was proposed 2000 and launched in 2010. The Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) 
started in 2003 among the ASEAN+3 countries to develop efficient and liquid bond markets in Asia, so that the region’s 
high savings can be better used for regional investment. 
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At the first ASEAN+3 (ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea) Leaders’ Summit 
Meeting held in 1998, the East Asian countries involved decided to set up the East Asia Vision 
Group (EAVG) to study a long-term vision for economic cooperation. The EAVG submitted a 
policy proposal, including the formation of an East Asian Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA), to the 
ASEAN+3 leaders in 2002. In 2006, the group proposed to the ASEAN+3 economic ministers that 
the EAFTA be negotiated among ASEAN countries first, and membership be opened to other East 
Asian economies.56 The leaders welcomed the outcome of the group’s study, but did not accept the 
start of the independent process of the EAFTA right away.  
 
The economic rationale for an EAFTA was that the production networks and supply chains 
in Asia had been developed most significantly among the ASEAN+3 members and so harmonizing 
rules of origin among these countries could produce the greatest tangible benefits.57 Furthermore, 
the ASEAN+3 framework had developed as the most feasible regional framework in East Asia, 
since it already provided ministerial processes for regional cooperation in various policy areas. After 
concluding the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) in November 2002, China subsequently 
proposed the establishment of an EAFTA among ASEAN+3 countries in 2004.  
 
Japan proposes the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) 
 
Japan and some ASEAN countries like Singapore and Indonesia did not respond positively 
to the Chinese proposal. In 2006, Japan proposed another idea for an East Asia-wide FTA: the 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA). This agreement would include a free 
trade area covering the ASEAN+6 countries (i.e. the ASEAN+3 countries plus India, Australia and 
New Zealand).  
 
Japan’s economic rationale for the CEPEA was that the economic gains from the CEPEA 
were projected to be larger than that of the EAFTA.58 Moreover, the incorporation of a resource-
rich Australia and a fast-growing India was expected to provide substantial benefits to the economic 
growth of East Asia. Many analysts also argue that the CEPEA idea lies behind Japan’s strategy of 
                                                 
56  ASEAN, “ASEAN Plus Three Corporation”, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2009, accessed 11 December 2014, 
http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/asean-3/item/asean-plus-three-cooperation 
57  Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja. "Asian FTAs: Trends, prospects and challenges." Journal of Asian 
Economics 22 (2011): 14.  
58 Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja. "EAFTA or CEPEA: which way forward?", ASEAN Economic Bulletin 25 
(2008): 113-139.  
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taking a leadership role in setting up a regional institution in East Asia, to counter the China-driven 
EAFTA.59 The formation of both the CEPEA and EAFTA thus reflects the political and economic 
competition between Japan and the China to take leadership of the establishment of a region-wide 
FTA.  
 
Contesting templates for East Asian regionalism: EAFTA vs. CEPEA  
 
Stallings and Katada argue that “coherent regional integration” is by no means a logical or 
natural consequence of FTA proliferation in the Pacific Rim.60 In reality, talks on the formation for 
an East Asia-wide FTA did not progress smoothly largely because two concepts for realizing the 
formation were proposed, and the feasibility studies of each concept initially proceeded without any 
initiative to harmonize them. This competitive dynamic between two regional trade templates, each 
supported by a major regional power, can also be seen in China-backed RCEP and the US-led TPP. 
 
The EAFTA and the CEPEA were put in parallel development after 2006. The China-Japan 
rivalry on EAFTA vs. CEPEA and the divided positions of ASEAN members were reflected in the 
ASEAN summit in October 2009 – no definitive choice was agreed upon and the decision was to 
form a study group to review the two proposals together.61  Then in August 2011, Japan and China 
jointly proposed the formation of a regional FTA in East Asia during the ASEAN+3 and East Asian 
Summit (EAS) economic ministers’ meeting, much to the surprise of the ASEAN countries. Clearly, 
both China and Japan were interested in speeding up the process of regional economic integration. 
What accounts for their sudden willingness to cooperate after years of deadlock? According to 
Urata, China’s push for an East Asian FTA was primarily influenced the progress of new Asia-
Pacific economic framework – the TPP – under the leadership of the US, and in particular, Japan’s 
decision to participate in the TPP in 2011.  
 
But how did the TPP come about? To understand the origins of the TPP, we first have to 
understand the progress of the Asia-Pacific track for regional economic integration thus far.   
 
                                                 
59 Shujiro Urata, “Constructing and Multilateralizing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: An Asian 
Perspective”, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research, No. 23853 (2013): 8.  
60 Barbara Stallings and Saori Katada, “Conclusion: FTAs in a Competitive World.” In Competitive Regionalism: Explaining 
the Diffusion of FTAs in the Pacific Rim, ed. Katada, Solís, and Stallings, 236-251. 
61 Chia, “The Emerging Regional Economic Integration Architecture in East Asia”  
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2.3. The TPP: A US-led framework that goes beyond trade  
 
As mentioned in section 2.1, trans-Pacific economic regionalism as championed by APEC 
had stagnated by the early 2000s, in contrast to the growth of East Asian regionalism during the 
same period. However, in 2004, the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) refreshed the trans-
Pacific vision by proposing a Free Trade Area Asia Pacific (FTAAP), which would be (in principle) a 
free trade agreement embracing all APEC members. The apparent clash between the East Asian 
“vision” embodied in the EAFTA and CEPEA proposals, and the trans-Pacific vision reflected in 
the FTAAP was resolved (at least on paper) at the 14th APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting held in 
2006 in Hanoi, Vietnam. The APEC leaders compromised by formally adopting the Regional 
Economic Integration agenda, which recognised the FTAAP was recognised as a “long-term 
prospect”. The absence of a credible vehicle for early implementation of the trans-Pacific approach 
to regional liberalization was remedied in 2008 by the emergence of the TPP initiative.  
 
The TPP began as a small agreement but soon grew into one with huge implications. The 
original TPP, also known as the Pacific Four (P4) agreement or the Trans-Pacific Strategic 
Economic Partnership (TSEP), was an FTA concluded between Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New 
Zealand, and Singapore in 2006. Despite no geographic proximity, the P4 embraced a shared vision 
for forging a high-standard, comprehensive agreement, which would allow for full goods market 
access without exclusions (i.e. zero tariffs) by 2015. This small group took an open-minded 
approach and embraced the participation of other countries (especially the other APEC members), 
which would enhance the economic benefits derived from the FTA.62  
 
The TPP negotiations were greatly energized by the participation of the US in September 
2008. US participation became the catalyst for other Asia-Pacific states to jump onto the TPP 
bandwagon. By November 2008, Australia, Vietnam and Peru all decided to join the TPP 
negotiations. The initiative gathered more momentum in 2009 when the Obama administration 
made the TPP a centrepiece of its new trade policy and its economic “pivot” to Asia. Mexico and 
Canada were accepted as new members in October 2012, making all three NAFTA members part of 
the TPP architecture. Japan also formally joined the TPP negotiations in March 2013, under the 
newly elected government led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.  
                                                 
62 Meredith Kolsky Lewis, "Expanding the P-4 Trade Agreement into a Broader Trans-Pacific Partnership: Implications, 
Risks and Opportunities." Asian Journal of WTO, International Health Law and Policy 4 (2009): 401, 405-406. 
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Importantly, the progress in the TPP negotiations rejuvenated the stagnating progress on the 
proposed East Asia-wide FTA. The TPP influenced the strategies of Japan and China to the extent 
that the two countries agreed to launch the RCEP. That is not to say that the TPP was the only 
factor that led to the Sino-Japan consensus on the RCEP, but it certainly was the biggest catalyst, as 
reflected in the timing of the RCEP proposal.  
 
2.4. The RCEP: Integrating the EAFTA and CEPEA proposals 
 
 
 The ASEAN Framework for Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was 
announced at the ASEAN Summit in Bali in November 2011. China and Japan’s joint proposal in 
August 2011 to establish three working groups for trade and investment liberalization gave ASEAN 
the opportunity integrated to table the RCEP proposal during the 2011 ASEAN Summit. The 
RCEP neatly bridges the EAFTA and CEPEA proposals by adopting an open accession scheme (i.e. 
“ASEAN++”) so that any party that meets the template can join in the future.63 The primary goal of 
the RCEP is to consolidate the trade system in East Asia combining the five ASEAN-plus FTAs 
into a single agreement. The RCEP was then officially launched at the ASEAN Summit in Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia, in November 2012 and the first round of negotiations took place in March 2013.  
 
While it has been argued that the RCEP is led by China, it is in fact, an explicitly ASEAN-led 
initiative, especially since ASEAN is already the de facto hub for East Asian FTAs due to the many 
ASEAN+1 FTAs already in force. The “Guiding Principles and Objectives” of the RCEP also state 
explicitly that the RCEP will maintain “ASEAN centrality”, meaning that ASEAN is accorded the 
coordinating role in he process. (A detailed discussion of ASEAN centrality can be found in section 
IV.) Nevertheless, despite ASEAN being the “driver’s seat” of the RCEP, the initiative has received 
strong backing from China, which leads many commentators to view it as China’s counterweight to 
the US-led TPP. This concern is grounded in the valid assumption that China’s economic size and 
centrality in East Asian production networks would confer it the most influence in the launch, 
progress and outcomes of the RCEP negotiations.  
 
                                                 
63 However, the current RCEP negotiations are only taking among the ASEAN+6 countries. The envisioned accession 
clause will likely be added after a RCEP template has been agreed upon among the ASEAN+6.  
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2.5. Which way forward: TPP or RCEP?  
  
As mentioned, the RCEP and the TPP are both potential building blocks towards the 
FTAAP endorsed by the APEC members. The 2010 APEC Economic Leaders Meeting appeared to 
mark an important step towards resolving the question of how these separate initiatives (i.e. the East 
Asia track and the trans-Pacific track) would be reconciled in the future trade architecture of the 
Asia-Pacific. In the APEC leaders’ 2010 statement, the status of the FTAAP was elevated from that 
of a “long term prospect” to that of “a major instrument to further APEC’s Regional Economic 
Integration agenda”. The leaders further declared that the FTAAP is to be “pursued as a 
comprehensive free trade agreement by developing and building on on-going regional undertakings, 
such as ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6 and the TPP, among others.” 
 
While APEC countries unambiguously see the FTAAP as end-point to be reached in the 
evolution of the Asia-Pacific regional trade architecture, they also effectively endorsed the “two 
track” approach to achieve the FTAAP. The open question how the two “tracks” might evolve into 
the FTAAP provides additional pressures for progress to be made towards each track, since it can be 
reasonably anticipated that the extent to which each track can influence the evolution towards the 
FTAAP and the design of the FTAAP itself, will be at least partly conditioned by the strength of 
momentum within each track. In other words, the RCEP and the TPP are competing to shape the 
FTAAP, resulting in not just a contest of templates, but also a “race” towards the conclusion of 
negotiations. (Section IV will address the latest developments on the FTAAP proposal.) 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
This section highlights the main trends and events, at both the global and regional level, that 
have led to the proliferation of FTAs in the Asia-Pacific. The expanding network of bilateral and 
plurilateral FTAs created a “noodle bowl” situation, which then led to proposals for region-wide 
FTAs. The search for a broader regional economic architecture eventually took the form of the 
RCEP and the TPP, representing the East Asia and Asia-Pacific approaches to economic integration 
respectively. Notably, there is an interactive dynamic between the RCEP and the TPP in that they 
stimulated each other’s conception and growth.  The next section will highlight the differences in 
membership, objectives and prospective content of the two intiatives.  
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III. TPP vs. RCEP: Key Features   
 
Differentiated by their membership, scope and level of ambition, the TPP and RCEP 
embody competing visions for how the Asia-Pacific trade system should evolve. This section will 
compare and contrast the main elements of the two agreements, which present two different but 
nonetheless overlapping templates of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific. This paper argues 
that the membership, objectives and substantive content of the two templates reflect the competitive 
dynamic between them. The table below summarizes the key features of the TPP and RCEP 
agreements that this section will address in detail. 
 
Table 2. Key Features of the TPP and RCEP agreements (March 2015) 
 TPP RCEP  
First mooted  December 2009  November 2011  
Official negotiations  March 2010  May 2013  
Intended completion  Early 2015   Late 2015  
Negotiating rounds 
completed  
19 5  
Total GDP  US$27.5 trillion 
(September 2013) 
US$17 trillion (July 2013) 
Primary Goal  Address new and 
traditional trade issues 
through a comprehensive 
“twenty-first century” 
FTA  
Address noodle bowl problem 
by multilateralizing ASEAN 
FTAs  
Membership model  All Asia-Pacific countries 
accession encouraged  
ASEAN-plus-X model, 
accession yet to occur  
Relation to regional 
architecture  
Not tied to any existing 
organization 
(independent of APEC) 
Affirms principle of ASEAN 
Centrality  
Scope and coverage  “WTO Plus” aspirations 
– 20 non-tariff issues 
targeted  
“WTO consistent” only – 
mostly focussed on tariffs  
Major sponsor  US-led  ASEAN-led in principle, 
strongly backed by China  
Current members  12: Australia, Brunei, 
Canada, Chile, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, NZ, 
Peru, Singapore, US, 
Vietnam  
16: ASEAN-10, Japan, Korea, 
China, India, Australia, NZ 
Significant “absent 
members” 
China, Indonesia, Korea*, 
India 
US 
Common members  Australia, Brunei, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, NZ, Vietnam 
 25
Commitment level  High level of trade 
liberalization (~98% tariff 
elimination) 
Lower level of trade 
liberalization (~90% tariff 
elimination) 
Special treatment of 
developing economies  
None (may provide 
different schedules to less 
developed economies for 
FTA implementation) 
Provided; consistent with 
ASEAN-Plus-One FTAs 
Mode of agreement  Include all issues in a 
“single undertaking”  
Gradual and sequential; 
different components negotiated 
and implemented under 
different time schedules  
Note: *In December 2013, South Korea formally expressed interest in joining the TPP negotiations.  
Source: Author’s compilation from various sources  
3.1. Agendas  
 
The TPP and the RCEP have different but overlapping objectives and guiding principles. 
The differences in agendas between the agreements are not accidental; they reflect contrasts between 
the economic interests of Asian economies and more developed countries like the US. Asian 
agreements seek to preserve “policy space” (i.e. flexibility on the part of national governments) and 
encourage trade in manufactured goods, consistent with the comparative advantages of counties in 
the early and middle stages of development. 
 
3.1.1.  The TPP’s Goals: An ambitious 21st century agreement  
 
 The TPP has often been referred to as a “platinum standard”, “21st century” agreement, 
signalling its high level of ambition. In November 2011, the leaders of the TPP countries endorsed a 
framework for the evolving trade pact that envisions “a comprehensive, next-generation regional 
agreement that liberalizes trade and investment and addresses new and traditional trade issues and 
21st century challenges.”64 On paper, the participants of the TPP aimed to craft a comprehensive 
agreement that (1) dismantles barriers to trade in goods and services; (2) develops a new trade 
rulebook in “WTO-plus” areas not yet subject to WTO disciplines, such as labour, environment, 
investment, and SOEs; and (3) seeks to develop a more coherent approach across sectors with 
regard to regulatory policies that affect flows of trade and investment. The overarching goal is to 
create a trade regime that exceeds both the WTO agreement and FTAs that have already been 
                                                 
64 Office of the US Trade Representative, “Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Ministers’ Report to Leaders”, 12 November 
2011, accessed 10 November 2014, www.ustr.gov 
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concluded by participant countries, and ultimately, set a precedent for future trade negotiations 
worldwide.   
 
3.1.2. The RCEP’s Goals: Consolidating the ASEAN+1 FTAs  
 
 The RCEP, on the other hand, has lower ambitions: it aims primarily to resolve the 
“multilateralize the noodle bowl” of FTAs among the ASEAN+6 countries. In the Joint Statement 
of the First Meeting of the Trade Negotiating Committee, the RCEP parties vowed to establish a 
“modern, comprehensive and high quality and mutually beneficial economic partnership agreement 
establishing an open trade and investment environment in the region” that will “have broader and 
deeper engagement with significant improvements over the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs”. 65  The 
Guiding Principles and Objectives of the RCEP state that the RCEP will cover trade in goods, trade 
in services, investment, economic and technical cooperation, intellectual property, competition, 
dispute settlement and other issues. However, the emphasis is firmly on goods, services and 
investment, which have been on the preferred focus of ASEAN in its existing “ASEAN-Plus” 
FTAs.  
 
However, the RCEP is not intended to replace existing FTAs among the negotiating parties. 
The guiding principles state that:  
“[The] ASEAN+1 FTAs and the bilateral/plurilateral FTAs between and among the countries will 
continue to exist and no provision in the RCEP will detract from the terms and conditions in these 
bilateral/plurilateral FTAs between and among the participating countries.” 
Instead, the RCEP will attempt to harmonize the diverse rules of origins (ROOs) among the 
“noodle bowl” of FTAs in the region.66  
 
Importantly, the guiding principles reiterate the importance of ASEAN centrality in the 
regional economic integration process. ASEAN leaders declared in the November 2011 Framework 
for RCEP the following:  
                                                 
65 ASEAN, “RCEP Joint Statement of the First Meeting of the Trade Negotiating Committee”, 10 May 2013, accessed 
on 30 September 2014, http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-communiques/item/regional-comprehensive-
economic-partnership-rcep-joint-statement-the-first-meeting-of-trade-negotiating-committee 
66  Sanchita Basu Das, “Asia’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership”, East Asia Forum, 27 August 2012, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/08/27/asias-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership/ 
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“[We resolve] to establish an ASEAN-led process by setting out principles under which ASEAN will 
engage interested ASEAN FTA partners in establishing a regional comprehensive economic partnership 
agreement and, subsequently, with other external economic partners…” 
This means that the RCEP negotiating process will follow the “ASEAN way”, where objectives and 
commitments are made based on consensus and in adherence to the “lowest common 
denominator”. Compared to the TPP, the RCEP takes on a more pragmatic and flexible approach, 
but also sets the bar much lower. It accepts that countries will reduce trade barriers at different rates, 
and also makes limited demands for regulatory harmonization.  
 
3.2. Membership and Accession Rules  
 
Together, the two “tracks” involve 20 countries. Seven countries – Singapore, Brunei, 
Malaysia, Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand and Japan – are participating in both tracks.  
 
Figure 1. FTA frameworks in the Asia-Pacific  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own summary   
 
 28
3.2.1. TPP membership: Not “Open to all”  
 
 As of 2014, 12 countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region have participated in the TPP 
negotiations: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, the US and Vietnam. Costa Rica, Colombia, Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand have also 
expressed their interested in joining the TPP. The current 12 TPP countries already form part of a 
growing network of Asia-Pacific FTAs. The current TPP partners also include four of the ten 
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Vietnam. ASEAN countries have negotiated a free trade area amongst each other as well as several 
external FTAs.  
 
Accession to the TPP involves a lengthy and laborious process of bilateral discussions and 
endorsement by each existing participant, then a collective decision to allow the newcomer entry, 
followed by notifications to domestic governments (e.g. US Congress). In theory, the TPP is open to 
accession by any country, even those outside of APEC. All countries currently involved in the TPP 
negotiations are also members of APEC, and they have stated that membership expansion will likely 
focus on other APEC members first, though non-APEC countries with a focus on trade 
liberalization, such as Colombia and Costa Rica, have also expressed an interest in joining TPP. 
 
Hamanaka argues that incumbents of the TPP have tried to put “latecomers” in a 
disadvantageous position in two ways.67 First, they try to limit the latecomers’ ability to influence the 
agenda of the TPP. Latecomers must agree on two negotiation modalities: (i) they must accept terms 
already agreed upon incumbents, and (ii) they do not have veto power on any chapter if the current 
negotiating partners reach an agreement on a chapter. In addition, latecomers are not allowed to 
view the negotiation text until they are accepted into the negotiating process. The second way to the 
put latecomers in a disadvantageous position is by imposing additional requirements. While there 
have been no formal accession procedures to the TPP (because it has not been signed yet), it seems 
that incumbents are attempting to “tame” latecomers by introducing a similar mechanism to 
accession conditionality: bilateral negotiations. For example, in the case of Mexico, signing of the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement was the precondition for its TPP participation as set by the 
US.  
                                                 
67 Shintaro Hamanaka, “TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting”, Journal of East Asian Economic 
Integration 18 (June 2014): 163-186.  
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 While the TPP outline currently has an accession clause, it is unclear what type of accession 
clause will be included in the final TPP text. It is likely that a newcomer’s participation will be 
subject to the approval of all TPP member countries, and that applicants who join after the TPP 
after the conclusion of the negotiations will be required to accept everything in the agreement. Of 
particular importance is that the TPP will have little consideration for developing countries. While 
capacity building will be an area covered in the TPP, all participating countries, regardless of their 
level of development, are expected to offer similar levels of commitment (as of yet). Hence, in 
reality, the TPP’s terms of accession for developing countries are differentiated from those of 
developed countries, given that developing countries will most likely have to make internal reforms 
to meet the pre-requisites for accession, whereas developed countries do not.   
 
3.2.2. RCEP Members: “East Asia only”  
 
 There are currently 16 participants in the RCEP, namely the ten ASEAN countries and its 
six FTA partners, Australia, New Zealand, India, China, South Korea and Japan. 12 RCEP 
participants are also APEC members. Participation in the RCEP is not “open” as of yet. Countries 
without an FTA with ASEAN (such as the US) cannot participate in RCEP negotiations. Any other 
ASEAN economic partner can participate in RCEP only after the completion of RCEP negotiations, 
using the accession clause to be included in the RCEP agreement (Principle 6): 
Any ASEAN FTA partners that did not participate in the RCEP negotiations at the outset would be 
allowed to join the negotiations, subject to terms and conditions that would be agreed with all other 
participating countries.  
Like the TPP, it is still uncertain what type of accession rule will be employed in the final RCEP text. 
While the Guiding Principles and Objectives for the RCEP state that it will have an accession clause, 
it is naïve to expect that the RCEP will follow open accession rules, given that even participating in 
the on-going RCEP negotiations is fairly exclusive.  
 
One important feature of the RCEP is its flexibility for less developed members and 
emphasis on developmental issues. This contrasts the TPP, which (so far) does not include clauses 
that call for differential treatment for developing members. The RCEP guiding principles state that:  
 30
Taking in consideration the different levels of development of the participating countries, the RCEP will 
include appropriate forms of flexibility including provision for special and differential treatment, plus 
additional flexibility for the least-developed ASEAN Member states.  
This implies that developing, but not developed, countries will receive favourable treatment. Initial 
signals from some of the RCEP countries have suggested a desire to protect sensitive products, as 
well as to allow long timelines for implementation. 
 
3.3. Issue Coverage and Prospective Content  
 
There are three main differences between the TPP and the RCEP in terms of their issue 
coverage. Firstly, the TPP covers as a much wider range of areas than the RCEP, including a wide 
range of issues not always found in traditional FTAs. Secondly, even in traditional FTA areas, such 
as goods and investment, the TPP has much stricter market access requirements. Thirdly, the TPP 
has placed special emphasis on the creation of fair, reliable and transparent economic rules and 
systems, attempting to streamline behind-the-border regulatory approaches. Given that the 
ASEAN+1 FTAs signed with countries like China, Japan and India contain a lot of exclusions for 
sensitive domestic sectors, the RCEP agreement is anticipated to be much less ambitious than the 
TPP in terms of issue coverage and depth of liberalization.  
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Table 3. Comparison of Issue Coverage in the TPP and RCEP  
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3.3.1. The Prospective Content of the TPP  
 
The TPP is envisioned to be a “living agreement”, meaning that it would not just be opened 
for annual reviews, but also allow regular and on-going discussions and revisions to stay relevant to 
trade trends.68 There are currently 21 working groups negotiating 29 chapters of the TPP. Trade 
issues cover two main components: (1) rules, disciplines, dispute settlement, institutional 
arrangements; and (2) market access for goods, services, procurement and investment. The TPP 
covers not only trade issues included in a regular FTA, but also non-trade issues – provisions that 
are crucial for the next wave of economic integration. Some of these provisions are especially 
difficult for developing countries to satisfy.  
 
Table 4. TPP issues under negotiation  
 
 
                                                 
68 Elms, Deborah K. "The Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement: Looking ahead to the next steps." ADBI Working 
Paper Series, No. 447 (December 2013): 6. 
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Although no draft texts from the TPP have been officially released (except for two drafts of 
the intellectual property rights chapter released on Wikileaks), sufficient information have emerged 
from the negotiations to provide a reasonably pictures both of the likely content of a number of 
sections of the agreement and also of the contentious issues.  
 
The following topics have been, or are being discussed, in the on-going TPP negotiations:  
 
• Market access for agricultural and industrial products. Parties aim for duty-free access 
(i.e. zero tariffs) for trade in goods. They are also dealing with export and important licensing 
procedures, custom issues and trade facilitation. Unconfirmed reports from the negotiations 
indicate that the agreement on complete elimination of tariffs has been reached in respect of 
very high percentage of tariff lines, well over 95%.69 Whether full liberalization of 100% of 
tariff lines will be achieved is a still an open question. A fundamental disagreement among 
the participants is over whether TPP commitments should be plurilateral commitments that 
replace existing bilateral commitments, or whether TPP commitments should be negotiated 
only between those participants that do not already have a bilateral FTA between them. 70 
 
• Services. The provisions relating to services will follow the so-called “NAFTA” model, 
whereby the services chapter covers “cross-border services”, while the investment chapter 
covers investment in services as well as in other sectors. The agreement would employ a 
negative list approach71 for sectoral coverage of the services commitments (this means that 
provisions in the services chapter apply uniformly to all sectors except those specifically 
excluded). The negative list will include financial services, including insurance and insurance-
related services, banking and banking-related services, as well as auxiliary services of a 
financial nature, to be addressed in a separate chapter.  
 
• Agriculture, other than market access. The agreement will deal with sanitary and 
phytosanitary (i.e. measures to control agricultural pests and pathogens) standards, tobacco 
                                                 
69 Scollay, 39.   
70 Deborah Elms and C. L. Lim, “The TPP Negotiations: Overview and Prospects.” RSIS Working Paper No. 232, 
Singapore: Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2012.   
71 The adoption of a negative list approach generally reflects a higher level of ambition than acceptance of a positive list 
approach. 
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regulation, and agricultural competition. A controversial proposal in the TPP would provide 
for enhanced enforceability of some “WTO-Plus” sanitary and phytosanitary measures, by 
subjecting them to dispute settlement.72 
 
• Rules (Intellectual Property Rights). The TPP will include chapters and provisions that 
build on disciplines contained in the WTO’s Uruguay Round agreements on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) and intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement. Intellectual 
property has been the most controversial topic in the TPP negotiations. Some proposals put 
forth in the TPP negotiations relate to issues that have not been resolved internally in the 
member countries, as exemplified by the intense controversy generated by the proposed 
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in the US.  
 
• Rules of Origin. The agreement will incorporate cumulation provisions to allow cumulation 
for origin purposes across all TPP members.73 This will be a significant advance on the 
present situation, where the rules of origin in some FTAs result in preference being denied if 
inputs are sourced from other TPP economies.  
 
• Investment. Provisions of investment protection, ensuring non-discrimination, a minimum 
standard of treatment, rules on expropriation and prohibitions on specified trade distortive 
performance requirements. Provisions for investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS), which 
involves provision of an arbitration process outside the legal system of the host economy for 
resolving disputes between foreign investors and host economy governments, have been the 
most contentious issue in the negotiations on investment.74  
 
• Competition Policies. Establishment and maintenance of competition laws and authorities, 
procedural fairness in competition in law enforcement, transparency, consumer protection, 
private rights of action and technical cooperation.  
                                                 
72 Implementation of SPS measures in existing FTAs of TPP participants is generally on a “best endeavours” basis, 
without recourse to dispute settlement.  
73 Since many of the parties to the TPP already have bilateral FTAs, being part of the TPP implies that inputs originating 
from a TPP country that are included in a final good exported by another TPP country to a third TPP member are 
regarded as originating in the first country. This fosters the participation of TPP members in regional production 
networks. 
74 Scollay, 43.  
 35
 
• Government procurement. The agreement states common principles and procedures, as 
well as specific obligations for conduct of procurement; it aims at comparable coverage by 
all members, while recognizing transitional measures for procurement markets of developing 
countries.  
 
• Environment and labour issues. The agreement may contain substantive provisions on 
new environmental issues, such as marine fisheries and other conservation issues, 
biodiversity, climate change, and environmental goods and services, in addition to 
cooperation for capacity building. Negotiations on environment and labour have centred on 
proposals put forward by the US, which reflect, and in some respects extend the formula 
developed by the US in previous FTAs. The enforcement provisions in the US’s TPP 
proposals are reportedly facing strong resistance from most if not all TPP participants. 
 
• E-commerce. These provisions aim at eliminating or minimising impediments to electronic 
transactions that are increasingly included in FTAs involving TPP participants. The 
provisions may stipulate that no custom duties are to be imposed on digital products, and 
they also include commitments to free flow of information. Several participants considered 
these proposals unacceptable restrictions on the setting of government policy relating to 
cross-border data flows, and others expressed concern that the proposals make insufficient 
allowance for their privacy laws, which may for example restrict the cross-border transfer of 
personal information.  
 
• Development and capacity building. Despite the inclusion of development as one of the 
cross-cutting issues to be reflected in the TPP commitments, there has been so far little sign 
that agreement is likely on commitments with substantial resource implications. A proposal 
by Malaysia that would require commitment of significant resources of capacity building 
proposals has reportedly attracted little support, and the outcomes in this area appears likely 
to fall well short of the rhetoric that surrounded the inclusion of development and capacity 
building in the TPP agenda.75  
                                                 
75 Ibid. 
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• State-owned enterprises (SOEs). SOEs play a significant role in the economies of several 
current and prospective TPP countries (e.g. Vietnam, Singapore, Chile, Japan). Australia and 
the US have advocated a policy “competitive neutrality” among public and private 
enterprises in order to mitigate market distortions caused by preferential treatment of SOEs.  
Looming large is the consideration that rules developed in the initial TPP accord will set 
important precedents for SOEs of future members, especially China.  
 
 
The TPP’s wide coverage requires extensive negotiations between member states in order to 
achieve the goal of a significant and far-reaching agreement. In addition, the goods sector is being 
negotiated based on existing bilateral FTAs among the TPP countries. Thus, where FTAs exist 
between TPP members, they are likely to be adopted within the TPP, whereas countries without an 
existing FTA between them have entered into negotiations on a bilateral basis. Other issues are 
being negotiated among all parties; the goal remains a single agreement applicable to all members.  
 
3.3.2. The Prospective Content of the RCEP  
 
As mentioned, the primary goal of the RCEP is to multilateralise the regional trade system 
by combining the five ASEAN-plus FTAs into a single agreement. The key focus of the RCEP is on 
trade in goods – to negotiate further tariff reductions. Far less attention is paid to other issues, and 
the agreement aims to be “WTO consistent” rather than “WTO Plus”. Only six non-tariff issues are 
being pursued (compared to the TPP’s 20), and the negotiating parties have been far less specific 
about what they intend to agree on in these areas. 
 
The actual texts of the RCEP have not been released and the content of the negotiations are 
arguably even more secretive than those of the TPP. 11 working groups and sub-working groups 
have been formed to discuss the following issues:  
 
• Trade in goods 
• Trade in services  
• Investment 
• Intellectual Property Rights 
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• Competition  
• Economic and Technical Cooperation  
• Legal and Institutional Issues 
• Rules of Origin  
• Customs Procedures and Trade Facilitation  
• Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
• Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformity 
More specifically, the RCEP seeks to achieve the following:  
 
• Gradually reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers on most trade in goods to create a free trade 
area. Kuno and Fukunaga consider benchmarks for tariff elimination coverage of 90% to 
95%.76 
• Largely eliminate restrictions and discriminatory measures on trade in services for all sectors 
and modes of services.  
• Create an open and facilitative climate for investment.  
• Address the special needs of less-developed ASEAN economies through early elimination of 
tariffs on products of interest to them, and through the provision of development assistance 
to narrow development gaps. 
• Provide for dispute settlement mechanisms to effectively resolve trade disputes.  
3.4. Current state of negotiations  
 
Both the TPP and RCEP are mega-regional undertakings that involve many countries with 
diverse trade policies and priorities. Naturally, the negotiations for both tracks are highly laborious, 
complex and challenging.   
 
3.4.1. TPP negotiations drag on  
 
The TPP agreement has undergone 20 rounds of formal negotiations for nearly five years. 
According to the TPP roadmap, negotiations were supposed to start in 2011 and end in 2013. 
                                                 
76 Yoshifumi Fukunaga and Arata Kuno, "Toward a Consolidated Preferential Tariff Structure in East Asia: Going 
beyond ASEAN+ 1 FTAs", ERIA Policy Brief (2012) 
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However, due to disagreement over several challenging issues, negotiations cannot be concluded as 
scheduled. The TPP negotiations remain ongoing through informal rounds, as well meetings among 
the chief negotiators and trade ministers. Both TPP leaders and ministers met on the sidelines of the 
November 2014 APEC meetings, but no major breakthrough was announced. Press reports suggest 
that the next meeting among TPP trade ministers is expected sometime in mid-March of 2015. As of 
December 2014, eight out of the 29 chapters have been finalized, namely development, regulatory 
coherence, competitiveness and business facilitation, small and medium enterprises, temporary 
entry, cooperation and capacity building, administration and institutional arrangements, and section 
A of competition policy. The remaining 21 chapters have outstanding issues that are still being 
negotiated.  
 
Although the outstanding issues may be relatively limited, these issues are also likely the 
most challenging. The scope of tariff and agricultural quota removal or market access on sensitive 
products, particularly agricultural goods, as well as provisions over nontariff issues such as 
intellectual property rights, the environment, state-owned enterprises, and investment are reportedly 
among the most contentious unresolved issues. The US’s bilateral market access negotiations with 
Japan have been particularly challenging as Japan seeks to maintain import protections for several 
categories of sensitive agriculture products and the US seeks to address concerns over nontariff 
barriers in the Japanese auto market. As the two largest TPP economies, these bilateral talks have 
significant implications for the broader 12-country TPP negotiations and the timing of their 
conclusion. 
  
 According to many economists, the timing of the conclusion of the TPP negotiations largely 
depends on the US. Recently, President Obama submitted the Trade Promotion Authority  (TPA) 
bill to Congress for consideration and ratification. Jeffrey Schott of the Peterson Economics 
Institute said that Congress would most likely adopt the TPA in early 2014, pinning hopes for the 
negotiation to conclude in the first half of 2015. However, there is strong domestic opposition to 
the TPP from non-governmental organizations and even among US politicians, due to its alleged 
lack of transparency and for certain controversial provisions (e.g. intellectual property rights).  
 
3.4.2. RCEP negotiations see no breakthroughs 
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 The RCEP negotiations kicked off in May 2013, and have since then been progressing in 
parallel with the TPP. The negotiations are scheduled to conclude by the end of 201577, possibly 
before the conclusion of the TPP negotiations. Incremental progress is being made, but like the TPP 
negotiations, there are still many challenges to be resolved due to differing levels of ambition among 
countries on diverse issues. The outstanding issues include agreement on the modality for tariff 
liberalization on goods, methodology of liberalization for investment and services, levels of 
protection to investors, high ambitions for the intellectual property rights and competition chapters, 
and broadening the scope of the RCEP. The question of how RCEP will apply to the bilateral 
relations between the 16 participants is a particularly complex one.  
 
 
To date, there have been seven rounds of negotiations, with the latest one being held in 
Thailand from 9-13 February 2015. There is lack of official information on the current state of the 
RCEP negotiations, which like the TPP negotiations, are conducted behind closed doors. The early 
signs are that progress has been made in the areas of goods trade and trade facilitation. The parties 
are said to have reached preliminary agreements on tariff reduction schedules, rules of origin, 
customs procedures and other trade facilitation measures.78    
3.5. Conclusion 
 
 This section has highlighted the key differences between the two templates for regional 
economic integration, as well as the challenges and progress of each prospective agreement. Despite 
overlapping issue coverage and membership, there is a huge gap in the level of ambition between the 
RCEP and the TPP, which reflects the differing economic and strategic interests of the countries 
involved. While both proposals are possible pathways to the APEC-endorsed FTAAP, it is uncertain 
as to whether the two mega-regional FTAs will converge, and if so, how they will resolve their 
fundamental differences. For the time being, the two templates exhibit a competitive dynamic due to 
their fundamental differences in agenda, membership and content.  The influence of major powers, 
particularly China and the US, on each set of negotiations further contributes to competition 
                                                 
77 ASEAN, “RCEP Joint Statement of the First Meeting of the Trade Negotiating Committee” 
78 Ganesha Wignaraja, “The RCEP: An Initial Assessment”, In New Directions in Asia-Pacific Economic Integration, ed. Petri 
Plummer and Tang Guoqiang (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2014), 96.  
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between the two templates. The next section will address the motivations and strategies of the key 
players involved both the TPP and the RCEP.   
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IV. KEY PLAYERS: MOTIVATIONS, STRATEGIES AND PERCEPTIONS 
4.1. Rationale for highlighting key players in the TPP and the RCEP  
  
 The RCEP and the TPP are essentially regional economic initiatives that emerged due to the 
convergence of interests among the participating countries. But they also reflect the economic and 
geopolitical interactions – which can be cooperative and/or competitive – among member countries. 
While each country obviously has different motivations for participating in either or both agreement, 
it is beyond the scope and ambition of this paper to do case studies for every country involved. 
Therefore, this section will only examine the motivations of the key players involved in the TPP and 
the RCEP for entering into the negotiations, their influence on the negotiations, and also their 
perceptions of each other (especially in the case of China and the US) and of the countervailing 
agreements. The countries or group of countries (as in the case of ASEAN) on which this paper 
focuses are generally perceived as having the most influence on the development of the two mega-
regional FTAs, primarily due to their economic power, which goes hand in hand with their 
geopolitical influence in their Asia-Pacific region. This section will focus on the motivations and 
strategies of the US, China, ASEAN and Japan with regards to the RCEP and the TPP, as well as 
the interactions among these countries.  
 
4.2. US: TPP as the economic “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific  
 
 The US is undoubtedly the leading advocate of the TPP and has considerable influence over 
the content of the prospective agreement. As shown in section III, the US has pushed hard for what 
it deems to be “next generation” issues (both trade and non-trade) to be included in the TPP. The 
entry of the US into the TPP negotiations also injected new energy into the initiative and attracted 
many more countries to join. Six of the 11 other countries involved in the TPP already have FTAs 
with the US: Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore. 
 
4.2.1. US FTA Strategy from 1990s to Present: “Competitive Liberalization” on all fronts  
 
US interest in regional trade initiatives started with the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which was concluded between the US, Canada and Mexico in 1992. In the 
1990s, US FTA strategy was based on the explicit understanding that regional agreements negotiated 
in tandem with multilateral ones (i.e. WTO rounds) would favour the completion of the latter. In 
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1989, the US joined the APEC forum and in 1994, also launched negotiations with 33 other Western 
Hemisphere countries to complete a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005.79  
 
However, the ability of the US to negotiate FTAs was hampered by the veto of the fast-
tracing negotiating legislation by the US Congress throughout the 1990s. In fact, it was not until the 
passage of the “Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Act of 2002” that the US Trade 
Representative (USTR) was given the green light to seek out trade deals in multiple arenas. In the 
interim, US trading partners had signed many FTAs, meaning that by 2002, there was a widespread 
sense that the US was falling behind in the area of regional and bilateral FTAs.80  
 
Under the leadership of Rpbert Zoellick, the Office of the USTR announced its strategy of 
“competitive liberalization” in 2002.81 Since then, FTAs became a cornerstone of US strategy and 
similar bilateral FTAs have been negotiated between the US and other countries at varying levels of 
development. Ostensibly, these bilateral deals are with countries that area ready to move further with 
trade and investment liberalization despite the stalemate that has plagued the WTO Doha round 
negotiations.82  
 
4.2.2 US Motivations in joining the TPP: A Strategic Move 
   
The US was invited by New Zealand to join the TPP negotiations in 2005, but it did not 
agree to enter into talks until 2008. Why did the US only join the TPP talks only in late 2008?  
 
The Strategic “Pivot” to Asia 
 
                                                 
79 It was envisioned that NAFTA would be incorporated into the FTAA, which would embrace WTO-plus rules and 
norms that surpassed the achievements of the WTO Uruguay Round (1994). However, the FTAA talks have more or 
less stalled since the last round of negotiations in 2003, and the initiative also missed the target deadline of 2005.   
80 US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick lamented in 2001 speech that that “there are over 130 FTAs in the world 
today and the US party to only two of them.” Robert Zoellick, “American Trade Leadership: What Is At Stake?” 
Remarks made at a speech at the Institute for International Economics, 24 September 2001 (Washington, DC).  
81 Competitive liberalization refer to negotiation of bilateral FTAs with certain nations in order to stimulate negotiations 
on other trade fronts.  
82 These recent bilateral FTAs all involve small open economies with relatively high levels of trade dependence on the 
US market, and where the asymmetries are especially steep. Richard E. Feinberg, "The political economy of United 
States’ free trade arrangements." The World Economy 26 (2003): 1019-1040. 
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In 2009, the newly elected Obama administration made the TPP a centrepiece of its trade 
policy in the Asia-Pacific. President Obama argued that the strategic value of a potential TPP 
agreement parallels its economic value: 
“TPP is as important strategically as it is economically. Economically, TPP would bind together a group that 
represents 40 percent of global GDP and about a third of world trade. Strategically, TPP is the avenue 
through which the United States, working with nearly a dozen other countries (and another half dozen 
waiting in the wings), is playing a leading role in writing the [trade] rules of the road for a critical region in 
flux.”83 
During his State of the Union address to the 114th Congress, Obama also reiterated that the United 
States would benefit from developing the region’s trade rules as opposed to other regional actors, 
namely China.84  
 
Advancement of US trade policy  
 
The US participation in the TPP negotiations serves several strategic goals in US trade 
policy. First, it continues and expands a US trade policy strategy that began with the NAFTA, of 
using FTAs to promote trade liberalization and potentially to spark multilateral negotiations in the 
WTO. Secondly, joining the TPP was in part a defensive move by the US, which feared that it would 
be locked out of the expanding network of East Asian FTAs. The TPP presented the US with an 
opportunity to level the playing field for US exports to Asian markets, which Americans perceive to 
have been undermined by the undervaluation of key Asian currencies. Existing and prospective East 
Asian FTAs, such the RCEP, could have trade-diverting impact on US exports. On the other hand, 
the most controversial provisions in the TPP agreement are deemed to be especially important to 
U.S. commercial trade—agriculture, disciplines on services, investment, and intellectual property 
rights, as well as enforceable provisions on labor and environment. Third, the TPP is expected to 
contribute to US economic and job recovery by opening doors to US exports. As Ronald Kirk, the 
US Trade Representative said, “a declining US market share in Asia-Pacific countries means fewer 
US jobs” and the TPP “provides the opportunity to develop a new model for US trade negotiations 
                                                 
83 USTR, “Remarks by Ambassador Michael Froman at the Council on Foreign Relations: The Strategic Logic of 
Trade,” 16 June 2014, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2014/June/Remarks-
USTRFroman- at-Council-Foreign-Relations-Strategic-Logic-of-Trade  
84 Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address," Office of the Press Secretary (2015), 20 
January 2015, accessed 13 February 2015, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-
president-state-union-address-january-20-2015. 
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and a new regional approach that focuses more on jobs, enhances US competitiveness.”85 
 
An opportunity to define the trade agenda of the 21st century  
 
At the APEC Summit in Hawaii in November 2011, President Obama stated that “the TPP 
has the potential to be a model not only for the Asia Pacific but for future trade agreements.”86 This 
statement seems to confirm the strategic objective of the US to create new template for global trade 
relations. The present WTO system is increasingly irrelevant to the trade interests of the US, due to 
the WTO’s focus on trade in goods as well as its extremely low efficiency, as manifested in the 
stagnation of the Doha Round talks. Conversely, the TPP represents a way for the United States and 
its partners to advance discussions of a “21st-century trade agenda” that addresses both new trade 
issues (e.g. e-commerce) and non-trade issues (e.g. environment labour, state-owned enterprises). 
The US also hopes that the TPP can serve as a model for future negotiations bilaterally, regionally, 
or in the WTO by establishing norms and rules on new issues.  
 
Deepening the US’s Geopolitical Engagement in the Asia-Pacific 
 
The TPP also has potential geopolitical implications that are tied to US economic interests in 
the Asia-Pacific. The proposed TPP would not just deepen the US’s formal economic engagement 
with the Asia; a commitment to the TPP signals a commitment to keep the US military presence in 
Asia, and to continue serving as a stabilizing anchor in the region. In March 2013, National Security 
Advisor Tom Donilon confirmed the place of trade as part of the shift when he referred to the TPP 
as the “centrepiece of our economic rebalancing” and “an absolute statement of US strategic 
commitment to be in the Asia-Pacific for the long haul”.87  
 
  
                                                 
85 David Pilling, “Trans-Pacific Partnership: Far-reaching agreement could form powerful new trade bloc,” Financial 
Times, 8 November 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/47dd4d14-06cc-11e1-90de-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3VEgVxTZt 
86 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in the Meeting with Trans-Pacific Partnership”, Office of the Press 
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Contain the Rise of China?  
 
Some commentators also see the TPP as a US effort to contain China’s growing economic 
and political dominance in Asia. Although Washington policy circles tend to deny US geopolitical 
considerations in engaging in TPP negotiations, many analysts (especially Chinese ones) believe that 
the US is concerned about the loss of power and influence in Asia, possibly caused by the rise of 
China-centered cooperation in the region. According to these analysts, US proponents of the TPP 
see it as a way to thwarting the emergence of a China-centered East Asia economic bloc. Closer 
economic interdependence among East Asian states has encouraged US allies and friends in East 
Asia to pursue more ambitious blueprints for regional cooperation that exclude the US. In this light, 
its understandable that the US eagerly seeks the participation of allies like Japan to boost the TPP’s 
economic and strategic weight. Japan is by far the largest US trading partner among the TPP 
countries and together with the US, account for 90% of the total GDP of the TPP. It also does not 
have an existing FTA with the US. Japanese involvement would also help tighten the security 
alliance between the US and Japan, and would likely bring along South Korea into the TPP. As such, 
the TPP as a useful way of constraining the centrifugal tendencies of allies Japan, South Korea and 
Australia, which are increasingly attracted by, and dependent on, China’s growing economic power.  
 
4.3 China: “Peaceful Rise”?  
 
The competitive dynamics of the TPP and the RCEP are closely interlinked with the 
geopolitical implications of the rise of China and the perception of China by other states in the 
region. To understand China’s participation in the RCEP and its perceptions of the TPP, it is helpful 
to understand China’s its regional strategy in East Asia, which is arguably the most important region 
for China economically and geopolitically.  
 
Minimising the region’s “China threat”88 perception is key consideration in China’s regional 
strategy in East Asia because China needs a peaceful international environment in order to 
concentrate on its economic development (always its top national priority), and this in turn requires 
good relations with its neighbours.89 As the “China threat” is increasingly perceived in economic 
terms, the economic components of the strategy have become more important. Hence regional 
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economic integration has emerged as the core of China’s regional strategy in East Asia, and China 
has been very supportive of regional economic integration mechanisms like the ASEAN+3, and 
now the RCEP. 
 
4.3.1. China’s FTA strategy  
 
As mentioned in section II, compared with Europe and North America, East Asia is a 
latecomer in regional economic cooperation, and China is one of the latest in the region. China’s top 
trade priority in the 1990s was to join the WTO and its 15-year accession process (from 1986-2001) 
consumed most of its efforts in the area of trade. China did not start to seriously consider the 
feasibility of the regional trade agreements approach until the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis 
in mid-1997.90 There has always been a competitive dimension to China’s FTA strategy, and it seems 
that Beijing is very much influenced by the FTA strategies of other countries. Yang argues that 
economic, political and strategic competition can play a decisive role in China’s FTA decisions.91  
 
China’s initial interest in FTAs stemmed from concerns about being excluded from existing 
preferential arrangements. The emergence of regionalism in Latin American (Mercosur, 1991), 
Southeast Asia (AFTA, 1992) and North America (NAFTA, 1992), in addition to the formation of 
the European Union (Maastricht Treaty, 1992) raised fears that China might be left out of the new 
wave of regional integration. Although the number of FTAs in East Asia remained small, the Asia-
Pacific as a whole seemed to be entering into FTAs faster than many other regions, and with many 
more to come.92 Also, compared with the WTO, FTAs cover a broader range of issues and are more 
discriminative against non-partners.93 The Chinese government was thus advised to follow the FTA 
trend and to join the “small group” of FTAs after joining the “big group” of WTO in order to avoid 
being marginalized in global and regional trade.94 
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Beginning with the first China-ASEAN Summit in December 1997, China and ASEAN 
began exploring the possibility of a free trade area. In October 2001, ASEAN and China decided to 
establish an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ASEAN-China FTA) by 2010.  Since then, China has 
moved fast in concluding bilateral FTAs. As of early 2012, China has signed bilateral and multilateral 
FTAs with eleven countries/regions (ASEAN, Pakistan, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru, Hong 
Kong, Macau, Costa Rica, Iceland, Switzerland) and is negotiating another six, including the RCEP 
and CJK-FTA.95  
 
Economic Benefits of FTAs  
 
In terms of economic benefits, FTAs help make Chinese exports and businesses more 
competitive in five main ways. China uses FTAs to: (1) lower tariffs and thus reduce both export 
and import costs; (2) use rules of origins to overcome trade barriers96; (3) reduce the impact of trade 
diversion resulting from competing FTAs97; (4) help Chinese businesses to access overseas markets; 
and (5) reduce the number of antidumping investigations against China by (potential) FTA 
negotiation partners.98  
 
Political Implications of FTAs  
 
While economic competition is an apparent factor in China’s interest in FTAs, political 
competition is no less important. In analysing US FTAs, deLisle notes that: “FTAs can serve as an 
economic instrument in the pursuit of security goals that loom large in US foreign policy. More 
crassly put, instrumentally, they can serve can serve as economic goodies that Washington can dole 
out to serve political ends of building or reinforcing alliance-like arrangements. ”99 DeLisle points 
out that compared to the US, “the political dimension is even larger for Beijing and the commitment 
to the relatively radical economic liberalism idea behind FTAs (or of the broader international trade 
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regime) less established and robust.” Chinese analysts also emphasize that China’s FTA strategy 
should help it to “enhance its influence in the international political economy and expands its 
political and security space”.100 Therefore, China should make FTAs “an important tool for both 
economic diplomacy and political diplomacy”.101 Chinese analysts are wary of other major powers, 
namely Japan and the US, that try to negotiate FTAs with China’s neighbours.  
 
According to Song Guoyou, apart from an economic rationale to secure China’s future 
supplies of much-needed natural resources, improving its international environment, is one of the 
most important reasons that China pushes its FTA agenda.102 In particular, the key political objective 
of China’s FTA strategy is to improve and maintain stable political relations with its Southeast Asian 
neighbours. Though the Chinese government has persistently portrayed itself as “rising peacefully”, 
China’s emergence as a regional and global power has aroused both economic and strategic fears 
among ASEAN countries.103 Some of these fears have their roots in historic mistrust, and have been 
exacerbated by the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. China has been trying to diminish 
mistrust like this, and to build closer ties with most of its neighbours by offering them economic 
benefits through FTAs. China gradually realized the simple denial of non-aggressive intent should be 
made more credibly by offering concrete initiatives that produced tangible benefits.  In other words, 
China pursued a “charm offensive” in its FTA policy towards Southeast Asia.104 In particular, China 
demonstrated great generosity in accommodating ASEAN preferences in the ASEAN-China FTA 
(ACFTA). It accepted various formats and contents developed by ASEAN in the ACFTA 
negotiation, such as differential treatment and flexibility for new ASEAN members, and made a big 
concession by offering the Early Harvest Programme (EHP) – i.e. voluntarily opening its agricultural 
market to ASEAN members, most of which were agricultural exporters.  
 
Setting the rules of the international trade order: rule follower to rule maker  
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 Some Chinese analysts have argued that for great powers, playing a leading role in regional 
economic cooperation is not just for their economic and strategic interests in the region or for 
domestic benefits.  More importantly, the great powers are aiming at the external benefits, namely to 
increase their bargaining chips in multilateral (i.e. WTO) negotiations and further, to play a leading 
role in making international economic rules. 105  By this logic, one of China’s goals in joining 
international economic institutions is to shape the rules of the international trading system. 106 
However, Beijing is not actively challenging the existing international trading system by propounding 
a new set of rules on trade and investment, partly because China is still learning how to play the 
international economic game. Chinese analysts note that China utilizes the existing international 
economic order and then works with other countries, especially developing countries, to gradually 
improve it. 107 
 
4.3.2. The RCEP as China’s counter to the TPP 
 
 China has shown great interest in the RCEP, even though it does not exactly follow China’s 
proposed template for East Asian economic integration – i.e. the EAFTA. As shown in section II, 
the RCEP can be seen as a compromise between China’s EAFTA proposal and Japan’s CEPEA 
proposal. But what factors motivated China to compromise on its original template?  
 
It seems that the TPP has had considerable influence on China’s trade strategy. China and 
Japan jointly proposed the formation of an East Asian FTA in August 2011 at the ASEAN+3 and 
East Asian Summit economic ministers’ meetings, just before the leaders of nine TPP countries 
announced the broad outline of an expanded TPP in November 2011. In fact, it was China that 
encouraged Japan to consider the formation of the regional FTA.108 The US-inspired TPP essentially 
forced China to shift the geographical scope of the FTA formation from East Asia to the Asia 
Pacific via the ASEAN-led RCEP. Interestingly, the TPP also eroded the political confrontation 
between China and Japan over the regional FTA initiative, and produced a middle path – the RCEP.  
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While China’s strong support for the RCEP is due to several factors, this paper contends 
that TPP was the most important catalyst for China’s push for the RCEP. In other words, China’s 
renewed interest in FTAs with its neighbours derived primarily from its strategic intention to hedge 
against the progress of the US-inspired TPP.  
 
4.3.3. Chinese Perceptions of the TPP  
 
With regards to the TPP, there are three main schools of thought within the Chinese 
academic and policy circles: (1) the “containment” school; (2) the “economic competition” school; 
and (3) the “pro-TPP” school. The first school maintains that the main reason behind the US 
support for the TPP agenda is to use the TPP as a tool to economically contain China’s rise by 
reducing the Asian Pacific countries’ dependence on China.109 Some even claim that once the TPP 
comes into force, it will undercut the East Asian regional integration process (i.e. the APEC 
framework) that China has been advancing for a decade, posing a great challenge to China’s 
future.110 The second group of Chinese analysts argues that the US’s main intention behind joining 
the TPP is simply to boost its domestic economy via increased exports to the Asia-Pacific. 111 A third 
group of scholars believe that joining the TPP is aligned with China’s long-term economic interests.  
Becoming a member of the TPP could be beneficial to China in at least three ways: (1) allow China 
exert some influence over the rule-making of the TPP (though it is arguably too late into the 
negotiations for China to revise the chapters that have been agreed upon) to safeguard its own 
economic interests112; (2) facilitate the trade liberalization process in the Asia-Pacific region; and (3) 
stimulate domestic structural reforms.113  
 
4.3.4. China’s response to the TPP: RCEP, CJK FTA and the FTAAP 
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 Regardless of whether the TPP will be successfully implemented or not in the near term, 
most Chinese analysts agree that the most important strategy for the Chinese government at this 
point is to actively push for its own FTA strategy. Li Wei, President of the Development Research 
Center of the State Council, said in keynote speech at the Asian Financial Forum that the Chinese 
government’s “unswerving policy” is to accelerate the development of free trade with its major 
trading partners in Asia. The speech seems to be a clear indicate that China will actively propel the 
establishment of new bilateral and plurilateral FTAs with more of its Asian neighbours to counter-
balance the US-led TPP.114  
 
In this context, the RCEP is definitely an attractive option for the following reasons: first, it 
offers access to markets in Japan, India and Australia, otherwise not possible as previous attempts to 
establish FTAs with these three countries have not borne fruit. As China tries to rebalance its 
economic and trade structures, a more integrated East Asian market under the RCEP becomes more 
essential to its future growth. Second, it is a convenient way for China to exclude the US in the 
regional trade architecture of Asia. China avoids direct confrontation with the US since the RCEP is 
ASEAN-led. In addition to positive commitments to the RCEP, China increased its interest in the 
China-Japan-Korea FTA (CJK FTA) – deemed to be a critical step for forming a wider regional 
FTA. The first talks for the CJK FTA were held in March 2013. 
 
4.3.5. The Beijing Roadmap for the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) 
 
  The latest and most interesting development concerning these two mega-regional trade 
agreements occurred during the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting held in Beijing, China in 
November 2014. The main outcome of the APEC annual meeting in Beijing was an agreement 
among APEC members to launch a two-year “strategic study” of the Free Trade Area of the Asia-
Pacific (FTAAP).115 The FTAAP initiative is known as “Beijing Roadmap”, and is most strongly 
backed by China. Chinese President Xi Jinping said at a press conference after the conclusion of the 
APEC meeting that the move was "a historic step we took in the direction towards realizing the 
FTAAP”. Xi also said the FTAAP can be the "aggregation" of existing free trade arrangements and 
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that "the FTAAP does not go against existing free trade arrangements, which are the potential 
pathways to realize the FTAAP goals”.  
 
 While both the RCEP and TPP are considered stepping stones towards an APEC wide-
agreement, it seems that China has made a clear political move at a time when TPP negotiations are 
labored and when the US is facing difficulties on passing the trade promotion authority, which 
enables the fast-tracking of FTAs through Congress. While China has been pushing for a full 
“feasibility study,” this move has been resisted by the US and some other TPP negotiating partners 
as premature. This resistance stems from the US concern that engaging in a full FTAAP feasibility 
study at this time would detract from and interfere with completion of the TPP.  
 
For some, the announcement of the FTAAP is tantamount to China rivaling the US for free 
trade supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region. Jayant Menon, the Lead Economist at the Asian 
Development Bank, claims “the race is on between the US and China to dominate the rules-setting 
game for trade by being the first to be able to announce plans for a free trade area in the Pacific 
Rim."116 However, others predict that the FTAAP study announced at the Beijing APEC summit 
will also provide impetus for TPP completion.117 With that study due at the end of 2016, the US and 
the other TPP countries will want to ensure that their own trade deal is completed well before the 
launch of the next phase of the FTAAP. In this way, the TPP—as one of the declared paths to a 
larger regional agreement—will be in a position to strongly influence the eventual shape, rules and 
level of market opening of an FTAAP.  
 
It is also interesting to note that in 2013-2014, the Chinese leadership advanced its regional 
intiatives as a whole package of concepts, policy plans, and economic incentives. In this context, the 
RCEP is not just a regional trading pact, but also a strategic counterweight to US “rebalancing” in 
the Asia-Pacific. During the 2014 APEC Summit in Beijing, Xi Jinping announced that as its “overall 
national strength grows, China will be both capable and willing to provide more public goods for the 
Asia-Pacific and for the world, especially new initiatives and visions for enhancing regional 
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cooperation”.118 To this end, China has come up new initiatives for enhancing regional cooperation, 
namely the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st century Maritime Silk Road”. To finance 
infrastructure constructions to complete the aforementioned “One Belt, One Road” regional 
development strategy, China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in in 
October 2014, with 21 other Asian countries.119 It also committed $40 billion to a Silk Road Fund, 
which will make investments in regional connectivity and infrastructural projects, including new 
airports, ports, roads and railways. The fund and the bank will support Chinese intiatives to enhance 
trade and economic growth in the Asia-Pacific. These ambitious undertakings also function as action 
plans that buttress the RCEP. Essentially, initiatives the AIIB, like the RCEP, can be perceived as 
manifestations of the fast-growing economic and diplomatic influence of China in the Asia-Pacific, 
and arguably, its attempt to set up parallel structures that challenge the established international 
order. However, while the AIIB is explicitly Chinese-led, it is not yet clear how much influence 
China has or will have in the RCEP negotiations and outcomes.  
 
4.3.6. Will China join the TPP?  
 
 As aforementioned, it seems unlikely that China would agree to a process of bilateral 
discussions and arduous preconditions simply to get to the TPP negotiating table, and accept a raft 
of US-drafted rules that are disadvantageous to China commercially. However, criticisms against the 
TPP have toned down since June 2013, when the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that 
the “TPP, ASEAN Plus Three, and the ASEAN Plus Six are all possible paths for Asia-Pacific 
regional integration”. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce also announced that China would study 
the TPP’s influence on China’s economy and the possibility of China’s entry into the TPP 
positively”. In the wake of these official statements, Chinese sources have instead offered measured 
responses, which indicate that at this point in time, it is not in China’s interest to join the 
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negotiations but that its position could be revisited at an appropriate time in the future.120 One 
Chinese academic suggested that “if the TPP is not well-received by intended member states, China 
would be in a comfortable position to extend its economic leverage for the norm-setting powers, 
and to convert the TPP into an FTTA according to a set of compromised terms, if not China’s 
terms.”121  
 
 There are two main factors prompting China to change its attitude to the TPP. First, it has 
recognized the importance of the TPP to its economy. Trade with TPP countries accounted for 33% 
of China’s total trade in 2013. Among its ten largest trading partners, five are TPP member countries 
(i.e. the US, Japan, Australia, Malaysia and Singapore), which together account for 28% of China’s 
total trade in 2013. Moreover, TPP countries have become important destinations for Chinese 
investors. In 2013, China’s total outward reached $124 billion, making it the third largest investor in 
the world after the US and Japan. 122 Japan’s decision to join the TPP is another reason for China to 
seek inclusion in the TPP. Japan’s entry significantly raised the potential of the TPP, which will 
cover nearly 40% of global economic output and one-third of global trade. Strategically for the US, 
including Japan in the TPP underpins an already close US-Japan security alliance, and cements 
Japan’s economic orientation in a US-led Asia-Pacific agreement at a time when Japan is also 
participating in a range of other Asian FTAs, and underscores American and Japanese leadership in 
the region. China would be left out of a Asia-Pacific trade system that includes the two other largest 
economies in the world (also its two largest trading partners) if the TPP is realized without its 
participation.  
 
 While joining the TPP is an option, the Chinese government is particularly concerned with 
the difficulties of joining the TPP at a later stage once the design of the TPP is finalized. This is 
because the agreements between China and ASEAN are typically far less ambitious that the FTAs 
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involving the US, of which the latter largely involves legally binding and enforceable obligations.123 
From the Chinese perspective, the main problem lies in the so-called “platinum” standards the US is 
pushing for in the TPP, which are inconsistent with China’s principle of non-interference in other 
nations’ domestic affairs.124 These include stronger intellectual property rights, tighter labour and 
environmental standards and regulatory discipline of state-owned enterprises. Hence, Chinese 
scholars have asserted that for China, the ultimate decision to join the TPP is more of a political 
than an economic question. 
 
 Despite the economic competition between the US and China (as manifested in their 
respective concerns over the RCEP and the TPP), China is trying to further its economic ties with 
the US. It requested a pilot study on the feasibility of an FTA with the US and also restarted 
negotiations on a Bilateral Investment Treaty, and these should be nearing completion as of mid-
2014. An investment treaty is generally viewed as a necessary step towards a possible FTA.125   
 
4.4. ASEAN: maintaining centrality in regional institutions 
 
  The Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the one of oldest and most 
significant intergovernmental organizations in Asia, and it is now a major driving force for economic 
cooperation and integration in the Asia-Pacific. It is relevant to the two mega-regional trade 
agreements for two reasons. First, the RCEP is officially recognized as an ASEAN-led process. 
Second, four ASEAN countries are TPP member countries and a few others, namely Thailand and 
the Philippines, have expressed interest in joining the TPP. This section will: (1) analyse the 
motivations of ASEAN (as a single entity) in initiating the RCEP and then “leading” the 
negotiations process; (2) highlight the difficulties that ASEAN faces in driving the RCEP; and (3) 
briefly comment on the specific motivations of countries that are involved in both the RCEP and 
TPP.  
 
4.4.1. ASEAN’s Pursuit of Economic Cooperation and Integration   
    
 Currently, ASEAN consists of ten member countries with a total of 625 million people 
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(2013) – the third largest population in the world after China and India. The ASEAN countries 
collectively make up the eighth largest economy in the world, and ASEAN as a bloc is projected to 
become the world’s fourth largest economy in 2050.126 Southeast Asia also adjoins the world’s largest 
potential markets, straddle critical shipping lanes and is now a key player in contests for influence in 
the Asia-Pacific region.  
 
Trade is integral to the success and growth of ASEAN economies. Over the past two 
decades, ASEAN’s economic ties with Asia have intensified, whereas ASEAN’s trade with the US 
and the EU has declined markedly. China is now ASEAN’s number one trading partner, with its 
China share of ASEAN trade rising from 2% in 1993 in 12% in 2011. At the same time, Japanese, 
US and EU shares of ASEAN trade have dropped significantly from 1993 to 2011 (US: 18% to 
8.5%; Japan: 20% to 10.3%; EU: 15% to 10.6%).127  
 
Hence, economic cooperation and integration within ASEAN, and increasingly within the 
broader East Asian region, has been a key area of focus for the organization ASEAN. In 1992, 
members agreed to create the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), a regional common market, which 
became effective in 1993. Tariffs among the ASEAN nations have been greatly reduced, especially 
among the six oldest ASEAN members. The sub-region’s economic prospects will be much 
enhanced by an ambitious integration effort, known as the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), 
which seeks to achieve a single market and production base, including higher mobility of labour and 
capital within the region. The launch of the AEC is currently planned for the end of 2015.  
 
ASEAN’s external economic integration efforts have proceeded in two major phases. The 
first focused on external relationships based on “ASEAN Plus” FTAs with partners mainly in Asian 
but also beyond it. Starting with China in 2003, ASEAN has concluded free-trade agreements with 
South Korea (2006), Japan (2008), and Australia, New Zealand, and India (2009). The second phase, 
now underway, are the two major regional cooperation intiatives – the TPP (four ASEAN members 
are currently involved) and the RCEP.  
 
                                                 
126 In 2014, ASEAN’s GDP amounted to $2.4 trillion. The bloc is expected to continue its average annual GDP growth 
of 6% for the next two decades, only a little slower than those of China and India. 
127 Syetarn Hansakul, “ASEAN Economic Community: A potential game changer for ASEAN countries”, Current Issues, 
Deutsche Bank, 14 June 2013.  
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 Besides pushing for intra-ASEAN integration and economic cooperation with the wider 
Asia-Pacific, ASEAN has also initiated a number of pan-Asian economic and political institutions. 
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), for example, was initiated in 1994 by the ASEAN states to 
serve “an effective consultative Asia-Pacific Forum for promoting open dialogue on political and 
security cooperation in the region”.128 The EU, US China and Russia are all current participants in 
the ARF. The ASEAN Plus Three (ATP) was set up as a forum in 1997 to coordinate cooperation 
between ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea.  
 
 ASEAN’s largely successful trajectory in institution-building and staying relevant to the great 
powers in the region – namely China, Japan, India, and the US – has given the organization 
increasing confidence in various aspects of cooperation and integration. The integration imperative 
has been reinforced by the growth of China and India. In this context, regional integration also came 
to be seen as an essential tool for competing with, or at least prevent being overshadowed by, giant 
neighbours. 
 
4.4.2. ASEAN negotiates a “middle path” between Japan and China  
 
 As mentioned in section II, an intense competition emerged between two approaches to 
regional economic integration: an ASEAN+3 grouping favoured by China and an ASEAN+6 
grouping proposed by Japan. ASEAN also did not have the willingness and capabilities to 
coordinate the two concepts suggested by Japan and China. Insofar as the Sino-Japanese rivalry did 
not produce direct political and economic disadvantages, ASEAN did not dare to coordinate the 
sharp confrontation between China and Japan. Nevertheless, in a breakthrough agreement at 
ASEAN’s 2011 Bali Summit, China and Japan allowed both tracks to move forward and jointly 
proposed working groups to shape the progress of negotiations. ASEAN, in turn, tabled its first-
ever proposal for an East Asian regional FTA, later formalized as the RCEP initiative in 2012.  
 
4.4.3. ASEAN Centrality  
 
 The RCEP is arguably the most concrete example of “ASEAN centrality”129 in practice. As 
mentioned in section III, the ASEAN Framework for RCEP enshrines ASEAN centrality as a key 
                                                 
128 ASEAN Regional Forum, “27th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Statement”, accessed 20 February 2015, 
http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html  
129 The term “ASEAN centrality”, now common in use, represents ASEAN’s vision to remain relevant and economically 
competitive in the Asia-Pacific region. 
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principle of the RCEP. However, it is important to note that there is no consensus about what is 
“ASEAN centrality”. Does it mean the ASEAN is in the “driver’s seat” of the RCEP – taking 
instructions from the passengers (i.e. other RCEP members) – or is it more of a driving force that 
engineers compromises and sets directions? Acharya defines “ASEAN centrality” as ASEAN’s 
central role as “the building bloc and hub of developing a wider Asian or Asia-Pacific regional 
architecture”.130 Wang, on the other hand, believes that ASEAN is not the power centre and can 
only play a “functional” role, acting as a platform for cooperation and possessing the functional 
rights. 131  Most analysts argue the success of the RCEP will ultimately depend on whether an 
agreement among China, South Korea and Japan (i.e. a trilateral FTA) can be concluded within its 
framework. Some advocates of ASEAN have argued that the bloc should go beyond merely 
coordinating external relations to become the driving force in charting the evolving regional 
architecture.  
 
4.4.4. ASEAN’s Motivations for “Leading” the RCEP 
 
 This paper argues that the RCEP was initiated by ASEAN due to two interrelated factors: (1) 
the progress on the TPP negotiations; and (2) the risk of losing “ASEAN centrality” (i.e. to avoid 
being marginalized by other regional intiatives).  
 
Political Considerations   
 
 ASEAN centrality was one of the biggest motivations for ASEAN’s proposal of the RCEP in 
2011. 132  In other words, ASEAN wants to avoid being marginalized by regional economic 
integration intiatives led by other (and notably more powerful) countries. The concept of ASEAN 
centrality first arose in discussions leading to the ASEAN Charter1 in the mid-2000s, but has since 
become a staple of ASEAN documents (e.g. AEC Blueprint, ASEAN Charter) and policy 
statements. The use of this term suggests that ASEAN not only wishes to play a greater role in 
economic processes in the region, but it also perceives its “centrality” to be challenged.  
 
 In the context of trade regimes, two initiatives are threatening ASEAN centrality in East Asia: 
                                                 
130 Amitav Acharya, “The end of ASEAN centrality?” Asia Times, 8 August 2012.   
131 Yuzhu Wang, “The RCEP Initiative and ASEAN ‘Centrality’,” China International Studies 5 (2013): 119-132.  
132 Yoshifumi Fukunaga. "ASEAN's Leadership in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership." Asia & the 
Pacific Policy Studies 2 (2015): 103-115 
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the TPP and the China-Japan-Korea FTA (CJK FTA). The TPP is generally understood as a US-led 
process where only four ASEAN members have access to confidential negotiation documents as 
original negotiating members. Given the “high-quality” nature of the TPP and its tough accession 
process, it would be impossible for the less developed ASEAN countries (i.e. Myanmar, Laos, 
Cambodia, which are also not APEC members) to join the TPP in the near future.  
 
 Meanwhile, the CJK FTA also has a large influence on the economic integration process in East 
Asia. ASEAN feared that the centre of gravity of trade integration might shift from Southeast Asia 
to Northeast Asia, especially with China’s rapid growth. The CJK have already signed the trilateral 
investment in May 2012, and is aiming to conclude the trilateral FTA by the end of 2015. Needless 
to say, ASEAN does not have any direct involvement in the CJK process. If the three large 
economies agreed among themselves on certain rules, ASEAN will have a lesser influence in the 
discussion of the RCEP. Although neither the TPP nor CJK FTA is free from challenges, their 
steady progress has attracted the attention of investors. By proposing an ASEAN-centred platform 
for a mega-regional FTA, ASEAN is trying to balance the non-ASEAN initiatives.   
 
 Moreover, the RCEP allowed ASEAN to mitigate the “braking effect” brought about by the 
Sino-Japan tussle over the template for an East Asia-wide FTA133. ASEAN deftly tabled a suitable 
compromise formula in order to prevent intra-regional cleavage and to “bring Japan back into the 
fold of Asian regional integration” (Japan was considering the TPP as early as 2010).134 By proposing 
the RCEP at the East Asian Summit in November 2011, ASEAN tried to consolidate its position in 
Asian economic integration.  
 
Economic Considerations  
 
 There is a strong economic rationale behind ASEAN’s push for the RCEP. ASEAN has already 
signed FTAs, not only ASEAN+1 TAs, but also bilateral FTAs with all the RCEP members. On the 
other hand, ASEAN’s FTAs partners do not have FTAs with each other for the most part.135 Thus, 
ASEAN is currently enjoying the hub position in the hub-and-spoke structure of FTAs, which gives 
                                                 
133 Das, “Asia’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership” 
134 Jin, “RCEP vs. TPP”  
135 As of February 2014, ASEAN’s six FTA partners have signed five FTAs with each other, out of 15 possible FTA 
combinations.  
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ASEAN countries an export advantage.136  
 
 Given the current FTA situation involving ASEAN, the RCEP can reap large economic 
benefits for ASEAN. First, some of the current ASEAN+1 FTAs do not provide high-level market 
access opportunity for ASEAN. Thus, RCEP can potentially provide an opportunity to deepen the 
liberalization commitments in trade in goods, services and rules of origin (ROO). Second, the 
coexistence of ASEAN+1 FTAs itself is creating the “noodle-bowl” situation, which hinders the full 
utilisation of preferential schemes. RCEP can potentially harmonize various rules and commitments 
in the ASEAN+1 FTAs. Third, economic simulation models show that ASEAN will lose its 
potential economic gains if the CJK FTA is signed but the RCEP is not.137 This negative effect 
comes from preferential erosion that ASEAN is currently enjoying in its hub position.138If the RCEP 
is successfully concluded, however, ASEAN can mitigate such negative effects and further expand 
its economic opportunities.  
 
 The content of the RCEP also reflects ASEAN’s collective economic interests. In particular, 
ASEAN has a strong preference for maintaining flexible and equitable treatment for countries at 
different developmental stages. The RCEP’s guidelines reflect this element, and one of its objectives 
is to increase economic and technical cooperation to narrow development gaps. 
 
4.4.4. TPP: A Threat to ASEAN Centrality and Unity? 
 
 The TPP has had complicated effects on ASEAN members’ trade policy and relations. 
Although some ASEAN countries are actively involved in the TPP (and more have expressed 
interest), most scholars view the TPP as having a negative impact on the ASEAN-led RCEP process 
and on intra-ASEAN integration efforts.   
 
 Firstly, the TPP may distract ASEAN unity. ASEAN members’ position on the TPP was 
divided, which potentially risked undermining ASEAN’s collective will in regional FTA formation. 
Currently, four ASEAN members are part of the TPP talks. Singapore and Brunei were the original 
                                                 
136  J. Alba, H. Jung, D. Park “Do Hub-and- Spoke Free Trade Agreements Increase Trade?”, A Panel Data Analysis . 
ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, No. 46, Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2010 
137  K. Itakura, “Impact of Liberalization and Improved Connectivity and Facilitation in  ASEAN for the ASEAN 
Economic Community”, ERIA Discussion Paper 1, 2013, ERIA. 
138  Petri and Plummer, “ASEAN Centrality and the ASEAN–US Economic Relationship”, 22-23.   
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TPP members (the P4) and Malaysia and Vietnam joined the TPP negotiations after the US did. 
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar  - non-members of APEC – are unlikely to meet the pre-requisites 
for being a TPP member. Some members who have not joined the TPP, such as Indonesia, have 
expressed concern about the negative impact that TPP participation may bring on their domestic 
industry.  If the TPP is concluded faster than the RCEP, these members might push for more 
ambitious outcomes in the RCEP while non-TPP members stick to lower targets.139 Secondly, some 
ASEAN members feared that the TPP formation would shift the locus of regional integration from 
ASEAN to the US. Accordingly, ASEAN members needed to advance a new trade initiative to 
strengthen or maintain ASEAN’s centrality in promoting regional economic integration.  
 
Essentially, both the RCEP and the TPP processes reflect ASEAN’s internal weaknesses. It is 
not easy for ASEAN as a bloc to drive substantive negotiation in the RCEP because ten countries 
with vast differences in levels of development would naturally find it hard to agree on a single 
position. If ASEAN delays in reaching a consensus among the ten members, its FTA partners (in 
particular China) may take over the “driving” process.  
  
4.5. Japan: An unlikely pivotal state? 
 
 Japan is involved in both the TPP and RCEP negotiations. Japan has been a party to the RCEP 
talks since its inception. In fact, Japan-proposed CEPEA can be seen as the conceptual precursor to 
the RCEP, given that the proposed membership of the CEPEA is reflected in the RCEP. Japan also 
acceded to the TPP negotiations in April 2013. In the words of former Japan’s Prime Minister 
Noda, Japan’s signal to join the TPP triggered “chemical reactions in regional and global FTA 
diffusion. 140  Solis and Katada argue that Japan’s “pivot” towards the TPP prompted China to 
accelerate the joint study of the CJK FTA and helped ASEAN overcome its indecision vis-à-vis the 
ASEAN+3 or +6 proposals by opting instead for the ASEAN++ framework.141 Some scholars even 
                                                 
139 In addition to the substance of the trade agreements, frequent TPP negotiations affect the negotiation resources of 
TPP members, and may delay ASEAN’s consensus-making process, as well as the RCEP negotiations.  
140 Mireya Solís and Saori N. Katada, "Unlikely Pivotal States in Competitive Free Trade Agreement Diffusion: The 
Effect of Japan's Trans-Pacific Partnership Participation on Asia-Pacific Regional Integration." New Political Economy 20 
((2015): 155-177.  
141 Ibid.   
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argue that Japan can be a “bridge” that brings the RCEP and the TPP together.142  
 
4.5.1. Japan’s FTA Strategy: Competing with China  
 
 As mentioned in section II, Japan’s interest in FTAs in the late 1990s was triggered by the 
proliferation of FTAs in the Americas and Europe in the 1990s. 143  The Japanese government 
became more interested in East Asian FTAs for both economic and political reasons. First, most of 
Japanese trade was with East Asian countries. Japanese trade with East Asia greatly expanded from 
1990 to 2011: exports from Japan grew 4.9 times and imports from East Asian countries grew by 5.3 
times, whereas Japan’s global exports and imports only grew by 2.8 times and 3.5 times during the 
same period.144 In general, FTAs yield economic benefits for Japanese businesses145 and are also seen 
as a means to stimulate domestic structural reforms 146 , particularly in the heavily protected 
agricultural sectors. Many analysts also argue that a major catalyst for Japan’s FTA drive, especially 
with ASEAN countries, is thought to be Japan’s rivalry with China over leadership in East Asia.  
  
 Beginning the 2000s, Japan’s historical and economic rivalry against China significantly 
influenced its regional FTA policy. When China first proposed the formation of an FTA with 
ASEAN in November 2000, many Japanese viewed the proposal as unrealistic lip service and paid 
little attention to it. However, China’s pre-emptive moves towards the ASEAN FTA stunned 
Japanese policymakers, who then had to adopt counter-measures. After China and ASEAN began to 
consider the ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) seriously, Japan began advancing talks on the ASEAN-
Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (ACJEP). If there had not been quick moves towards 
the ACFTA, it is unlikely that Japan would have moved as quickly to develop an initiative for 
                                                 
142 Junichi Sugawara, “Japan’s strategy on the regional economic integration of the Asia-Pacific region: its role as a bridge 
between the “Asia-Pacific” and “East Asia” ”, Mizuho Research Institute, Tokyo, February 2013.  
143 According to Japan’s FTA Strategy (October 2002), drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “East Asia lags Europe 
and the US in the development of a regional system despite its deepening political and diplomatic interdependence”. The 
paper also stated that “there is no doubt regarding the importance of the construction and development of a regional 
economic system under Japan’s leadership for the stable development of Japan and the East Asia region”. Accordingly, 
“economic partnership in East Asia revolving around Japan, South Korea and China, plus ASEAN” as “the top priority 
strategic target” for Japan. 
144 Shujiro Urata, "Japan's Trade Policy with Asia." Public Policy Review 10 (2014): 3. 
145 FTAs would firstly, help secure export markets for Japanese businesses and secondly, prepare relatively open business 
environments for Japanese corporations overseas. Japanese businesses suffered damage in export markets because they 
were excluded from bilateral and FTAs (e.g. NAFTA and EU) and were also restricted in their scope of activities, 
especially in developing countries.  
146 Since Japan’s economic stagnation began in the early 1990s, domestic pressure and internal impetuses seem so far 
insufficient to promote structural reforms. Given that the Doha Round has stalled, FTAs seem to be the only source of 
external pressure that can help Japan achieve an economic recovery.  
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economic partnership with ASEAN.  
 
 Japan’s rivalry with China is revealed in two other aspects of its FTA policy. The first is the 
targeting of FTA partners. Japan established bilateral FTAs with individual ASEAN members in 
addition to ASEAN as a whole entity. It began FTA negotiations with seven ASEAN members in 
succession from 2004 to 2007. Several scholars argue that such a bilateral orientation was sustained 
by a soft balancing against China’s commitment to stronger trade linkages with Southeast Asia. 147    
Importantly, there is widespread perception in the region that Japan lags behind China in its ability  
to use FTAs to score diplomatic points.148 For instance, Japan negotiated first bilateral FTAs with 
selected Southeast Asian countries, whereas China inked a trade agreement with ASEAN as a whole. 
 
 The second competitive feature is Japan’s approach to FTAs. The Japanese government 
emphasizes that its FTAs are of higher quality (broader issue scope and binding obligations) than 
Chinese ones, which have been characterised as brief, vague, and with an emphasis on conciliation 
rather than formal dispute settlement.149   Japan has also stressed its ability as an industrialized 
counterpart state that can facilitate the development of Southeast Asian countries. In this way, China 
and Japan are offering different “models” of regional integration and rule-making, and the race is on 
to see which one disseminates faster and further. In other words, Japan is competing with China to 
become the focal point of the regional integration scheme in East Asia.  
 
4.5.2. Japan’s Motivations for an East Asian-wide FTA 
 
 Japan hoped to promote the formation of an East Asian-wide FTA with three main 
motivations. First, it hoped to strengthen linkages with ASEAN, an economically dynamic and 
politically strategic group of countries, thorough a regional FTA. Positive engagement in the RCEP 
became a major-pillar of ASEAN-Japan collaboration. The second was the maintenance of 
commercial interest in competition against South Korea. Japan and South Korea are internationally 
competitive in similar industrial sectors, such as automobiles and electronics. Since South Korea’s 
                                                 
147 Japan used to the biggest external trading partner of ASEAN in the 1990s, and has been actively giving foreign aid to 
the less developed Southeast Asian countries. Munakata, Naoko. Transforming East Asia: The evolution of regional economic 
integration. Brookings Institution Press, 2006. 
148 Terada, Takashi. "Forming an East Asian community: a site for Japan–China power struggles." Japanese Studies 26, no. 
1 (2006): 5-17. 
149 Agata Antkiewicz and John Whalley, "China's new regional trade agreements", The World Economy 28 (2005): 1539-
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main FTA partners – the EU and the US – provided crucial markets for the Japanese manufacturing 
sectors, differences in tariffs were deemed to be serious handicaps to Japanese exporters. Therefore, 
while Japan searched for FTAs with the EU and the US (through the TPP), it needed to raise the 
efficiency of production networks and supply chains in East Asia through an East Asian-wide FA. 
Third, the formation of a regional FTA was necessary to secure benefits from production networks 
involving India and China, which also maintained relatively high import restriction measures. It was 
hoped for that the formation of a broad FTA would overcome business and trade constraints in 
overseas markets. 
 
 Moreover, as mentioned in previous sections, the geographic scope of the RCEP was aligned 
with the Japan-proposed CEPEA (ASEAN+6). The CEPEA proposal, with a larger membership 
than the China-proposed EAFTA, reflects Japanese intentions to dilute Chinese influence in the 
future of East Asian economic integration. For example, the incorporation of India, another large 
and emerging economy, prevents China from becoming the sole spokesperson for developing 
countries in a regional FTA. Since the contents of the RCEP are similar to those of the FTAs that 
Japan has with East Asian countries thus far, it naturally follows that Japan should actively promote 
the RCEP. As Japan already has in effect a regional-level FTA with ASEAN, bilateral FTAs with 
seven ASEAN countries, and a bilateral FTA with India, it hoped that the RCEP would standardize 
the differing tariff levels and rules of origin among the existing FTAs. Secondly, Japan would also 
further liberalize trade with major economies in the region, especially with its largest trading partner 
China (both import and export) and its third largest export partner and fifth largest import partner 
South Korea.  
  
4.5.3. Japan’s Motivations for Joining the TPP   
 
 Why did Japan decide to join the TPP after agreeing to adopt ASEAN’s RCEP template? 
Interrelated economic and political considerations, both domestic and international, factor into the 
current Japanese government’s strategic calculations to join the TPP.  
  
 The TPP had a significant impact on Japan’s trade policy even before the RCEP was launched. 
The Japanese government had bean investigation into TPP participation in autumn 2010, but could 
not make the decision to participate in the TPP negotiations for more than two and a half years. It 
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was in March 2013 that the returned Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government under Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe formally announced that Japan would join the TPP negotiations. Japan was 
originally cautious about its participation because it would have a negative impact on the 
development of its proposed regional FTA concept – CEPEA (the RCEP proposal had not been 
tabled yet) – and because it would invite strong opposition in domestic political circles and civil 
society.  
 
 However, the RCEP’s lower ambition (e.g. only six non-tariffs issues are being pursued 
compared to the TPP’s 20, limited geographic scope) also means it could be economically less 
attractive than the TPP to Japan.150 Japan, as a developed country, supports high-quality FTAs and 
envisage regional FTAs a platform for creating and disseminating innovative rulemaking, and agrees 
with US in negotiating positions on a substantial number of issues in the TPP. For instance, it 
supports strong intellectual property protection, expansion of services trade and liberalization, 
strong investment projection, and meaningful environmental and labour standards.151 
 
 The TPP may be the catalyst needed for the structural reform agenda of Prime Minister Abe. 
Japan’s existing network of FTAs has two weaknesses: it primarily consists of smaller countries 
lacking significant economic weight and fall short of the liberalization standards of most developed 
countries.152 The TPP, on the other hand, has potential economic and geopolitical gains that are 
significant enough to force through reforms, which under normal circumstances would not be 
possible. The TPP would also provide increase access to some of the most protected sectoral 
markets in the US and other TPP partners.153 
 
 The economic-security linkage with the US was an important consideration that pushed Japan 
to join the TPP. During the Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) period of government under Prime 
Minister Hatoyama in 2009-10, US-Japan diplomatic deteriorated largely due to the US military base 
issue in Okinawa. The following DPJ cabinets sought to restore stable political ties with the US by 
                                                 
150 The impact of each mega-regional FTA on Japan will depend on the finalized template of both agreements. Currently, 
it is difficult to estimate whether the TPP or the RCEP will benefit Japan more.    
151 Mercurio, 1561. 
152 For example, while every FTA negotiated by the US and EU covers 90% of products (measured by tariff lines), not 
one of Japan’s 13 FTAs meets this standard (mainly as a result of over 400 exclusions related to agriculture). 
153 Of course, Japan could try to open its markets and encourage foreign investment through domestic legislation, but 
such a path is clearly too politically difficult; therefore, Abe is taking the well-worn path of using a trade agreement to 
push through liberalization and reform commitments.  
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exhibiting willingness to engage in the US-inspired TPP. Japan also saw strengthened ties to the US 
as necessary because China was becoming more assertive in its surrounding marine territories, which 
led to maritime clashes and ensuing diplomatic confrontation between Japan and China.154 It is likely 
that Japan views the TPP and other regional initiatives as a way to diversify its trade relations from 
its current China-centric model and improve security links in the region.155Akihisa Nagashima, an 
assistant to the prime minister, stated that Japan needed to develop strategic environments that 
China would regard as formidable through participation in negotiations on the TPP.156 Clearly, the 
US and Japan share similar aims in using the TPP to counterbalance against China’s growth and 
regional dominance. 
 
4.5.4. Simulating the RCEP and the CJK FTA 
 
 In addition to domestic economic effects, Japan’s TPP participation also had significant 
implications for East Asian regional trade intiatives. The roll-out of the RCEP coincided with 
Japan’s announcement at the APEC Summit in 2011 that it would initiate consultations with TPP 
countries. Japan formally expressed interest in the TPP at the APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Honolulu 
on 13 November 2011. Four days later, the RCEP was proposed at the ASEAN Summit, and such 
progress was noted at the East Asian Summit on 19 November 2011. At the East Asian Summit in 
Bali on 19 November 2011, China not only fast-tracked a long-delayed feasibility study of a CJK 
FTA (initiated in 2003), but also hurried to complete the first negotiating round. 157 Moreover, on 20 
November 2012, RCEP negotiations were formally launched. This implies that despite past 
disagreements, China and Japan agreed on the value of launching the RCEP at a critical stage of 
TPP negotiations. On the same day, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda met President Obama 
and asked the US to support Japan’s TPP participation. Japanese trade scholar Nakagawa bluntly 
concludes that “Japan’s move to join the TPP must have made [the Chinese] change their mind.”158 
Japan sees the TPP participation could be used as a diplomatic card to draw concessions from China 
                                                 
154 For example, the incident between a Chinese trawler and Japanese Coast Guard vessels in the East China Sea in 
September 2010. 
155 Stephen R. Nagy, "Territorial Disputes, Trade and Diplomacy", China Perspectives 4 (2013): 49-57.  
156 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2 November 2011.  
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in an East Asia-wide FTA and potential CJK FTA, since China needs Japan to conclude an East 
Asia-wide FTA. 
 
 Finally, Prime Minister Abe, like President Obama, emphasized that the TPP will shape the 
trading rules of the 21st century. “The new economic order which will be created with the two major 
economic powers, Japan and the US, would not remain the “TPP only” rules. It should serve as a 
basis of rule-making beyond the TPP, in the RCEP and in the larger initiative of the FTAAP.”159 He 
also positioned the importance of TPP to the Asia-Pacific region and Japan’s importance in the 
region: “Future historians will no doubt see that the TPP was the opening of the Asia-Pacific 
Century…Japan has to be at the heart of the Asia-Pacific century”. These statements are a clear 
indication that Japan is prioritising the TPP due to its potential “game-changing” value, while also 
using the TPP negotiations to deepen its relationship with the US.   
 
4.5.5. Domestic Opposition to the TPP 
 
 Despite the potential economic and geopolitical benefits for Japan, domestic politics could 
still derail Japan’s trade reform and with it the ambition of the TPP. Some Japanese politicians still 
hold on to the notion of wholly protecting industries such as sugar, rice and beef. Deep opposition 
to liberalized trade exist among many segments of Japanese society, and Japanese leaders have thus 
far proven ineffective at taking on powerful lobby groups and vested interests. Although Japan’s 
entry definitely added more economic gravitas to the TPP negotiations (the US and Japan make up 
about 90% of the TPP members’ combined GDP), the negotiations have also become more difficult 
because of Japan. Major disagreements between the US and Japan over agricultural and automotive 
issues have stalled, thus failing to advance the negotiations.160  
 
4.6. Conclusion  
 
 This section has shown that the motivations of the four major players and their interactions 
with each other have shaped the competitive dynamics between the TPP and the RCEP. There 
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already exists competitive dynamics among the strategies of these major players. First, Japan and 
China competed to shape the template for East Asian economic integration through the CEPEA 
and the EAFT, respectively. Once the US and then Japan joined the TPP, the dynamics of Sino-
Japanese competition changed: China began competing with the US to shape the still evolving Asia-
Pacific trade architecture by throwing its weight behind the RCEP and most recently, the FTAAP. 
The RCEP is also ASEAN’s competitive response to fears of being marginalized by the US-led TPP. 
Essentially, the TPP altered the regional strategies of Japan, ASEAN and China, and the confluence 
of interest (influenced by the TPP) among these three major players explains the speedy launch of 
RCEP negotiations in November 2012. Japan was satisfied with the more expansive membership 
configuration, China was eager to advance the regional FTA, and ASEAN was pleased to imprint its 
negotiation approach on the RCEP framework.  
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V. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF RCEP AND TPP  
 
 This section will present theories of regionalism and international relations that have been, 
or can be, used to explain the coinciding emergence of the TPP and the RCEP. A strong theory 
should be able to explain not only the formation of both agreements, but also illuminate the 
processes by which the agreements are being negotiated.  
 
The most widespread and convincing theoretical explanations for the emergence of mega-
regional trade agreements are from the realist and liberal schools, hence this section will focus on 
theories that can adopt either realist or liberal frameworks, or a combination of both, to analyse the 
development of the TPP and the RCEP. This section ends with an analysis of the RCEP and the 
TPP by drawing on various theoretical approaches presented.  
 
5.1. Realist Views on the TPP and the RCEP  
 
From the realist perspective, regionalism is a manifestation of the politics of alliance 
formation. 161There is no essential difference between economic and political regionalism, and 
economic regionalism is seen as a strategy in the game of neo-mercantilist competition. Economic 
regionalism can also be deployed as a bargaining chip in the negotiations that determine the shape of 
the international economic order. In other words, the economic objectives of regional integration do 
not derive from the pursuit of welfare, but from the close relationship that exists between economic 
wealth and political power, and from concerns with relative gains and losses. Neo-realist arguments, 
in particular, emphasize that regional economic and security arrangements created by relatively weak 
states that remain contingent upon the policies and attitudes of major powers. The success of sub-
regional cooperation will be contingent upon the policies of either major powers acting unilaterally, 
or of the macro-regional groupings, which those powers will naturally come to dominate.162 For 
example, in the Asia Pacific, it is the evolving character of the Chinese-Japanese-US balance that will 
ultimately determine the fate of existing sub-regional grouping such as ASEAN, as well as broader 
cooperative schemes such as APEC or the ASEAN Regional Forum.  
                                                 
161 Regionalism is defined in this paper as a political, top-down process that involves institutionalisation. It can be 
understood as a political process in which measures such as economic policy cooperation and regulation are taken as 
standard. Haggard, Stephan. “The political economy of regionalism in Asia and the Americas.” The political economy of 
regionalism (1997): 47.  
162  Andrew Hurrell, “Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective”. Regionalism in World Politics, ed. Louise Fawcett and 
Andrew Hurrell (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), 49.  
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5.1.1. Hegemonic Theory  
 
Neo-realists have emphasized hegemonic theory when explaining regionalism. They tend to 
highlight the degree to which regional integration efforts were spurred by direct US encouragement 
and pressure. According the hegemonic stability theory, hegemony determines an international 
system’s stability. 163  Proponents of this theory place importance on the construction and 
maintenance of an international system in which hegemonic states can offer benefits to other 
countries. As long as this system remains advantageous, states other than the hegemonic ones can 
conduct economic activities without building their own international systems.   
 
There are at least three ways in which hegemony may act as a powerful stimulus to the 
creation of regional institutions. First, regionalism can emerge as an attempt to restrict the free 
exercise of hegemonic power through the creation of regional institutions. In the Asia-Pacific, the 
stronger states of the region (e.g. Japan, China, South Korea, Indonesia) have successfully resisted 
US efforts to promote APEC as an alternative vehicle for pressing its foreign economic agenda. 
From their perspective a loose regional arrangement is a way of keeping the US involved in the 
security of the region, whilst at the same time restricting its ability to press its economic agenda (i.e. 
greater trade liberalization).  
 
Second, weaker states tend to seek regional accommodation with the local hegemon in the 
hope of receiving special awards (i.e. bandwagoning). This is most likely when power differentials 
are great, when there are few external alternatives to accommodate the hegemon, and when states 
are in close geographic proximity. Related to the previous point, the greater the degree to which the 
dominant power is prepared to accept a rule-constrained hegemonic order, the more acceptable a 
strategy of bandwagoning for the weak states. Roy holds that ASEAN members bandwagon with 
China to the extent that they hope to trade with and maintain good relations with it, while 
maintaining low-intensity balancing with the US through defence cooperation.164  
 
                                                 
163  Kindleberger (1973; 1981), Krasner (1976) and Gilpin (1981) are representative scholars of the discourse on 
hegemony.  
164  Denny Roy, "Southeast Asia and China: balancing or bandwagoning?", Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of 
International and Strategic Affairs 27 (2005): 305-322. 
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Third, the hegemon may seek to become actively involved in the construction of regional 
institutions. If the hegemon is in an extremely dominant position, the very extent of power may 
make institutions and in this case, institutionalized regionalism unnecessary or marginal. A declining 
hegemony may press the hegemon towards the creation of common institutions to pursue its 
interests, to share burdens, to solve common problems, and to generate international support and 
legitimacy for its policies. This combination of marked inequality but still declining overall levels of 
power may be particularly conducive to the creation of regionalist arrangements.165 On one hand, the 
core state is strong enough to provide effective leadership and if necessary, coercion. On the other 
hand, this is balanced by the perception that declining power makes cooperation ever more 
necessary.166 
 
Invoking the hegemonic stability theory, Mansfield showed empirically that the number of 
FTAs and countries entering into such arrangements have increased with the decline of US 
hegemonic power.167 Mansfield states that the decline of hegemony will increase bilateral FTAs as 
well as multilateral/regional FTAs: namely, it will strengthen regional “cohesion”. Today, US 
hegemony is in relative decline in East Asia, meanwhile China is increasing its influence and power 
in the region. The hegemonic stability theory predicts that FTAs will form under these conditions. 
Indeed, both bilateral and regional FTAs are being concluded among East Asian states and between 
the US and East Asian states. However, these proposed mega-regional FTAs may not necessarily 
“strengthen” regional cohesion. Rather, many commentators warn that the different content and 
objectives of the TPP and RCEP threatens to divide East Asia and the Asia-Pacific.  
 
5.1.2. Balance of Power Theory  
 
With regards to the TPP and RCEP, Hamanaka argues that the formation of regional 
integration frameworks can be best understood as dominant state’s attempt to create a preferred 
                                                 
165 Crone (1993) argues that hegemonic decline rather than ascendance provides a more conducive environment for the 
formation of a regional institution. When in the ascendant, a hegemonic state has little incentive to pursue an 
institutionalized regional order. Only when a hegemonic state declines relative to other states in a region does it seek 
institutionalized regional cooperation. APEC is an example of the US trying to stay relevant in Asia and to counter 
China’s regional rise and dominance. Donald Crone, "Does hegemony matter? The reorganization of the Pacific political 
economy." World Politics 45 (1993): 501-525. 
166Ibid.  
167 Edward D. Mansfield, "The proliferation of preferential trading arrangements, Journal of Conflict Resolution 42 (1998): 
523-543. 
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regional framework in which it can exercise influence.168 Drawing upon the classical realist balance-
of-power theory, he argues that US leadership in the TPP negotiations is an attempt to balance 
against a rising China, whereas China’s strong push for the RCEP can be best understood as a 
counterbalance to the US-led TPP. Therefore, the formation of the TPP and the RCEP can best be 
understood as a competition between the US and China for control of both membership and agenda 
of regional economic institutions. The US and China seek to exclude each other from the TPP and 
RCEP, respectively, so that rules and agendas aligned with their core interests can be set. 169   
Hamanaka points out that the openness of these proposed agreements should not be 
overstated. As mentioned in section II, accession to the TPP negotiations requires newcomers to 
negotiate bilaterally with all incumbent members and also accept disadvantageous negotiation 
modalities and unfavourable requests set by incumbents. The high level of ambition of the TPP and 
the lack of developmental considerations make it very difficult for developing countries to join. And 
while the future RCEP agreement is likely to have an accession clause, it seems that the RCEP will 
remain a relatively closed club given its “ASEAN centrality” principle and exclusively “Asian” 
orientation.  
5.1.3. Limitations of Realist Explanations  
 
Of course, there are limitations with realist explanations. First, neorealism says little about 
the character of regional cooperation once it is established and the ways in which the habits of 
sustained cooperation may involve institutional structures very different from the traditional idea of 
a coalition or alliance. The mega-regional trade agreements discussed in this paper are 
unprecedented and involve many actors. Hence, they cannot be analysed solely as the manifestation 
of economic and political competitions between the US and China. Other important states and blocs 
of states, such as Japan and ASEAN, also play an important role in shaping the character of regional 
institutions (e.g. the RCEP largely follows the “ASEAN Way”). The US and China, as powerful as 
they are, are unable to shape these plurilateral trade agreements as they may be able to in bilateral 
FTAs with obvious power asymmetries. The numerous difficulties encountered in the prolonged 
TPP negotiations, especially as more countries (like Japan) join the talks, are telling examples that the 
                                                 
168 Hamanaka, “TPP vs. RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting”  
169 The TPP may someday include China, resulting from a policy of the US “engaging” or “socializing” China, rather 
than purely balancing against it. However the TPP still prevents China from setting the rules in Asia-Pacific economic 
institutions.   
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US cannot, and will not, have its way.  India and Japan’s participation in the RCEP talks also 
constrains China’s ability to shape the RCEP blueprint.  
Secondly, realist theories also say very little about the impact of domestic factors, when these 
may have had a significant influence on states’ changing FTA strategies and also the negotiating 
process of the agreements. Domestic factors thus constrain states’ pursuit of mega-regional trade 
agreements. For example, the administration under George W. Bush was only able to pursue an 
FTA offensive in East Asia because it secured the TPA. Currently, domestic opposition to the TPP 
is very strong in both the US and Japan. If Congress does not approve the TPA in time (and there is 
a sizeable camp within the US government that strongly opposes the TPP, with Senator Elizabeth 
Warren taking the lead), the US government may find itself in the untenable position of being the 
obstacle, rather than the driving force, in TPP negotiations. As mentioned in section IV, for the Abe 
government, joining the TPP stemmed partly from a desire to reform Japan’s stagnating economy. 
However, it is precisely the disproportionately influential and highly protected agricultural sector 
that may become a stumbling block for the TPP talks.  
Third, realism neglects the way in which the competitive dynamics of the system change over 
time. Its picture of the international system misses out on the ways in which both the nature of 
political and economic competition, and the consequent definition of states’ interests are affected by 
changes in the global economic system. Global economic integration may have acted as powerful 
stimulus to economic regionalism by altering and intensifying patterns of mercantilist economic 
competition, which presses towards the formation of larger units, both for economic efficiency and 
to ensure the political power necessary to bargain effectively over the rules and institutions that 
govern the world economy. For instance, Munakata argues that the driving force for East Asian 
regionalism from 1985 to 1992 was defensive regionalism – reactions to two main sources of 
extraregional pressures. First, the discrimination caused by preferential trade agreements in other 
regions such as EU and the Americas; and second, US unilateral actions and market 
fundamentalism. 170 The RCEP can be seen as the latest manifestation of “defensive regionalism” 
among East Asian states, in response to the EU and NAFTA, and now the TPP.  
 
 
                                                 
170 Nakao Munakata, Transformation of East Asia: The Evolution of Regional Economic Integration (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2006) 
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5.2.  Liberal Views of the RCEP and the TPP  
 
 Broadly, the liberal school of thought in international relations views regionalism as a 
functional response by states to opportunities and problems created by increasing regional 
interdependence. This perspective stresses the critical role of institutions and non-state actors in 
developing regional cohesion. There are two liberal theories in particular that have been used to 
explain the emergence of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific: neo-functionalism and neoliberal 
institutionalism.  
5.2.1. Neofunctionalism  
 
Neo-functionalists argue that high and rising levels of interdependence among states in the 
same region would set in motion an on-going process of cooperation, resulting in a “spillover 
effect” that would eventually lead to political integration. 171 Neofunctionalism emphasizes the role 
of non-governmental actors such as supranational organizations and enterprises in stimulating 
regional integration.172 It argues that trade concentration is the most important spark for regional 
integration. Mattli uses neofunctionalist logic to explain the demand side of regional integration: as 
flows of intra-regional trade and investment increase, private actors will call for the creation of 
supranational institutions that allow them to reduce the uncertainty and the transaction costs 
surrounding these cross-border economic transactions, and to reap the benefits of economies of 
scale.173  
 
While neofunctionalism identifies a powerful force for regional integration, it faces serious 
difficulties in explaining the timing of regional integration initiatives beyond Europe, as well as the 
more specific choices countries make in selecting their trading partners. Moreover, unlike the EU, 
regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific (e.g. ASEAN, APEC, ASEAN+3) are far from 
supranational, given that East Asian states are especially sensitive about the erosion of national 
sovereignty. Hence, plurilateral FTAs in the Asia-Pacific are not leading to politically significant 
integration. Regional economic integration in the East Asia and the Asia-Pacific is still very much 
                                                 
171 Ernst B. Haas, "The challenge of regionalism". International Organization 12 (1958): 440-458; Leon N. Lindberg, The 
political dynamics of European economic integration (California: Stanford University Press, 1963) 
172 J. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (New York: Harper and Row, 
1980), 430-434; Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 58-59 
173 Walter Mattli, The logic of regional integration: Europe and beyond (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
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driven by national governments and continues to be shaped by geopolitical and security factors, 
though governments do take into consideration the interests of businesses and domestic lobbies.  
 
As a modification of the neofunctionalist theory, Hidetaka argues that in East Asia, 
cooperative and integrative initiatives are undertaken through “pragmatic functionalism”.174 This 
means that cooperative intiatives among states are need-driven actions that produce immediate and 
realistic results. Non-political, functional areas are selected for cooperation because these areas easily 
produce outcomes. While neofunctionalism posits that the cooperative process among states should 
be sponsored by formal organizations that can impose and uphold agreements made by member 
states, pragmatic functionalism suggests that states find little interest in developing formal 
organizations that would exert binding power on them. Rather, they prefer mechanisms that 
enhance mutual benefits through cooperation that does not affect state sovereignty. Hidetaka asserts 
that this approach is suitable for East Asia because it is a region characterised by diversities, and 
lacks social cohesion and mutual trust that is needed for deeper political integration. This theory can 
explain why East Asian states have concentrated on economic regionalism – i.e. forming regional 
FTAs – rather political regionalism.  
 
Nevertheless, functionalist theories usually have more to say about the on-going role of 
institutions than about the factors that explain the birth of regionalist schemes. Hence, such theories 
are not very useful in explaining the emergence of the RCEP and the TPP, which are not just a 
“functional” development of increasing economic interdependence among regional states. As shown 
in section IV, the countries involved in these mega-rational trade agreements are also motivated by 
geopolitical considerations. In fact, economic interdependence has been shown to be a poor 
indicator to shifts in favour of regionalism. For example, intra-regional trade has consistently been 
higher for East Asia than for North America, and yet the US, Canada and Mexico moved much 
faster to negotiate the NAFTA than East Asian states.175 In addition, given the huge volume of trade 
between the US and China and Japan, none of them have concluded a bilateral or plurilateral FTA 
or with each other. Rather, they seem to be competing with each other to conclude bilateral and 
regional FTAs in Asia. This absence of FTAs among the “big three” and their selection of FTA 
                                                 
174 Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, The Political Economy of Regionalism in East Asia: Integrative Explanation for Dynamics and Challenges 
(Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 
175 Masahiro Kawai, "East Asian economic regionalism: progress and challenges" Journal of Asian Economics 16 (2005): 31-
32. 
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partners (usually much smaller states) demonstrate that FTAs are very much political decisions as 
they are economic ones, and cannot be explained merely as states’ responses to regional 
interdependence. Finally, functionalist theories do not explain why two different templates for 
economic integration emerged instead of one in the same region, and also why some countries are 
involved in both sets of negotiations.  
 
5.2.2. Neoliberal Institutionalism 
 
Similar to neofunctionalism, neoliberal institutionalism argues that increasing levels of 
interdependence among states generate increased demand for cooperation. Institutions are viewed as 
collectively generated solutions to different kinds of collective action problems.176 Institutions matter 
because of: (1) the benefits that they provide as cooperative mechanisms (e.g. decreasing transaction 
costs, reducing risks of defection); and (2) their impact on states and the ways in which states define 
their interests. Importantly, states can utilise multilateral institutions to raise their position in inter-
state relations. While a dominant state can raise its presence by committing to the development of 
an important institution, smaller states can preserve their interest by entangling a pre-eminent state 
in multilateral institutions and imposing on them institutional binding.  
 
In the context of regionalism, neoliberal institutionalism posits that regional economic 
integration processes create: (1) material problems – “international policy externalities”- that require 
collective management; and (2) incentives for reducing transaction costs and facilitating intra-
regional links. It is expected that both problems and incentives will lead to the expansion of formal 
or informal interstate cooperative institutions, including regional free trade areas. Institutionalist 
theories are useful in that they shed light the ways in which strategic interaction among states may 
lead to the emergence of cooperation in a given area of international relations. However, they do not 
adequately explain how seemingly competing institutions can develop as a result of both competitive 
and cooperative interactions between states or how these institutions can influence each other.  
 
                                                 
176 Keohane (1984) argues that institutions play significant roles in rectifying problems in the anarchical international 
system with respect to asymmetric information, moral hazard and potential dishonesty; in providing legal liability that 
establishes stable and mutual expectation about others’ patterns of behaviour, in offering relatively symmetrical 
information to the members, and thereby reducing the level of uncertainty and risk in making agreements; and in 
reducing transaction costs of legitimate bargains and increasing them for illegitimate ones. Robert, Keohane, After 
Hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1984) 
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5.3. Domestic-Level Theories  
  
 Domestic-level theories have also been advanced to explain the proliferation of FTAs 
regionally. One line of analysis argues that FTAs emerge because domestic lobbies push for trade-
diverting agreements that yield rents for specific producer groups. This theory argues that the 
decision of a government to negotiate a FTA is not influenced by the prior actions of other 
countries, but predominantly determined by domestic politics. 177 For one, Grossman and Helpman 
have found that protection for most sectors is the political recipe to muster domestic support for 
FTAs. Consequently, in this view, we should not expect various FTA negotiations among different 
sets of countries in the same region to occur at around the same time.  
 
One of the most influential theories that have been credited with explaining FTA 
proliferation is Baldwin’s theory of “domino effect”.178 Baldwin argues that the negotiation of trade-
diverting FTAs triggers a chain reaction of subsequent FTA enlargement, or the negotiation of 
alternative trade blocs, as disadvantaged non-member producers seek to minimize the trade and 
investment diversion caused by previous FTAs. According to this account, East Asian regionalism 
was essentially a defensive response to FTAs concluded in Europe and the Americas.179  
 
However, the trade diversion motive only explains a subset of FTAs. For example, Japan’s 
first ever FTA with Singapore was not informed by the desire to counter trade diversion since 
Singapore is already one of the most open economies in the world. More generally, domestic lobby 
arguments fail to explain how regional institutions help to satisfy state agendas that are not 
influenced by domestic concerns, such as to alleviate regional tensions, participate in trade and 
investment rule-making and to promote internal economic reforms through international 
agreements (often at the expense of domestic lobby groups). These political agendas, as shown in 
section IV, were all important motivations for the participation of major players in the RCEP and 
the TPP. 
                                                 
177 Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, “The politics of free trade agreements”, The American Economic Review 85 
(1995): 667-690. 
178 Richard E. Baldwin, “A domino theory of regionalism”, No. 4465, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993. 
179 Richard E. Baldwin, “The causes of regionalism", The World Economy 20 (1997): 865-888. 
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Ravenhill proposes a realist modification to Baldwin’s theory.180 He argues that a detailed 
examination of economic data finds no support for the argument that intra-regional economic 
interdependence in East Asia has increased significantly since the financial crises of 1997 and 2008.  
Hence, economic factors in many instances have been less important in the FTA formation than 
states’ use of FTAs to pursue political objectives.  Thus, the new East Asian regionalism is best 
understood as being driven by a “political domino effect” than an economic domino effect.  
5.4. Integrating Liberal and Realist Theories  
 
There are several theories on economic regionalism that draw on both the realist and liberal 
traditions. 
5.4.1. Institutional Realism   
 
Soft balancing (also known as institutional balancing or institutional realism) describes a 
strategy involving non-military tools such as international institutions, economic statecraft and other 
diplomatic arrangements in order to delay, complicate or increase the cost of using extraordinary 
power by a preponderant state. 181  This theory is an extension of realism (and in particular, 
hegemonic theory), but attributes greater importance to institutions as constraints on the behaviour 
of great powers (through institutional entanglement).  This concept has mainly been used to explain 
responses from second-tier major powers to US unilateralism.182  
 
It is also useful to explain political and economic relations in East Asia when China’s 
economic ascent poses potential threats to its neighbouring countries, which are apprehensive that a 
rapidly rising China will undermine their political autonomy and their ability to pursue their own 
national interests. Under such conditions, smaller states (like the ASEAN members) try to promote 
regional collaboration and develop regional institutions (in the economic, political and security 
sectors) as attempts to constrain the potentially disruptive effects deriving from China’s exercise of 
power. 183 According to this theory, regional institutions such as APEC, the TPP and bilateral FTAs, 
                                                 
180 John Ravenhill, “The ‘new East Asian regionalism’: A political domino effect”, Review of International Political Economy 
17 (2010): 178-208.  
181 Robert A. Pape, "Soft balancing against the United States." International Security 30 (2005): 17. 
182 Thazha V. Paul, "Soft balancing in the age of US primacy." International Security 30 (2005): 46-71. 
183 Kai He, "Institutional balancing and international relations theory: economic interdependence and balance of power 
strategies in Southeast Asia", European Journal of International Relations 14 (2008): 489-518. 
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are all functioning as a network coordination apparatus to prevent the region from regressing to a 
standard regional complex in which a polarized balance of power prevails.  
  
While institutional realism helps to explain the strategies of the ASEAN states towards the 
TPP and the RCEP, it does not fully explain why there is a competitive and mutually stimulating 
dynamic between the TPP and the RCEP. Japan and ASEAN wanted to restrain China’s influence in 
the RCEP by expanding its membership, why was China suddenly amenable to a non-ASEAN+3-
based FTA proposal? Also, the TPP does not fit into the “soft balancing” theory because it is led by 
a great power – the US – and China is not party to it.  
5.4.2. Competitive Regionalism    
 
Another integrative argument that was recently advanced by Solis and Katada to explain the 
spread of FTAs in the Asia-Pacific is that of “competitive regionalism”.184  This theory is inspired by 
two other ones: (1) Baldwin’s domino effect theory, which highlights that trade and investment 
diversion effects from initial FTAs can generate a chain reaction of subsequent preferential trade 
agreements; and (2) policy diffusion theory, which is based on the notion of policy interdependence 
where government choices are interconnected. In other words, the adoption of a certain policy by 
one government alters the probability of adoption for remaining non-adopters. 185  Hence, the 
diffusion approach moves away from the conventional political science approach of analysing varied 
domestic response to common external shocks (e.g. financial crises) and instead focuses on studying 
the influence of the FTA strategies of other (neighbouring) states on a state’s FTA policy.186  
 
Earlier work on policy diffusion identifies four major mechanisms of proliferation: (1) 
competition, as a horizontal economic process whereby states adopt policies to enhance their 
attractiveness vis-à-vis competitors; (2) coercion, as strong states pressure of manipulate incentives 
to force weaker states to adopt particular practices; (3) rational learning, as states adopt a policy after 
they assess its benefits and (4) emulation, as state adopt policies they deem appropriate from socio-
                                                 
184 Katada, Solis and Stallings, Competitive regionalism: FTA diffusion in the Pacific Rim  
185 David Strang, "Adding Social Structure to Diffusion Models An Event History Framework." Sociological Methods & 
Research 19 (1991): 324-353. 
186  Dietmar Braun and Fabrizio Gilardi, "Taking ‘Galton's Problem’ Seriously Towards a Theory of Policy 
Diffusion." Journal of theoretical politics 18 (2006): 298-322; The global diffusion of markets and democracy, eds. Beth A. Simmons, 
Frank Dobbin and Geoffrey Garrett (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
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cultural peers.187  The competitive diffusion of policies among states takes place when a country’s 
actions generate externalities for others, thereby creating an incentive to respond in kind. 188 When a 
competitor adopts a policy, the other country follows suit to remain attractive to foreign capital or to 
avoid loss of market share.189 The original diffusion theory defines competition exclusively as an 
economic phenomenon that mostly affects countries credibility or capital (mostly developing 
nations). 
 
The competitive diffusion model proposed by Solis and Katada explains the dissemination 
of FTAs in three new ways. First, it factors the interplay of multiple competitive objects in FTA 
negotiation, which go beyond the defensive economic interest of domino theory, to include regional 
leadership contest (i.e. political competition) and dissemination of alternative standards in regional 
integration (i.e. legal competition). Second, the model posits an alternative hypothesis about FTA 
proliferation, which focuses on the role of ideas or policy paradigms as countries emulate successful 
FTA strategies of leading reference nations (there is a constructivist strand in this argument, since 
emulation focuses on the role of ideas and the importance of social acceptance in the dissemination 
process). The proponents of this theory argue that if competition is the dominant force behind 
diffusion, the recent FTA proliferation would work against the emergence of coherent regional 
integration projects. But if emulation prevails, then bilateral FTAs will be supportive of region-wide 
integration efforts. This model also looks more directly into how domestic policy formulation 
processes influence the manner in which governments respond to external diffusion pressures. 
 
Solis and Katada test out their “competitive versus emulation” hypothesis using case studies 
in the Pacific Rim and find that competitive pressures have indeed led to the spread of FTAs in the 
Asia-Pacific. However, countries entered into the FTA in different ways and for different reasons. 
Economic pressures were especially important for smaller countries such as Singapore, Chile, South 
Korea and Mexico, as they aggressively sought to expand their preferential market access in large 
countries to counter current or future competitors. Large countries, by contrast, were not only 
responding to economic competition, but also political competition, in pursuing FTAs. 
                                                 
187 Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin and Geoffrey Garrett, "The global diffusion of public policies: Social construction, 
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Furthermore, the large countries used FTAs to set and spread rules and standards of trade (i.e. legal 
competition). 190  Writing in 2009, these scholars observe that political rivalry among the large 
countries (namely China, Japan and the US) undermined unity in the Asia-Pacific through diplomatic 
as well as rule-setting competition. They predicted that this dynamic and the prevalence of cross-
regional FTAs pursued by the smaller countries would prevent the consolidation of coherent 
regional projects in both East Asia and Latin America.  
5.5. Explaining the TPP and the RCEP using an integrated approach  
 
4.5.1. “Competitive Regionalism” Revisited  
 
 The paper finds that the theory that best explains the emergence and interaction of the TPP 
and the RCEP to be that of competitive regionalism. This theory provides a compelling framework 
for analysing the both the evolution of the TPP and the RCEP, as well as the interactive dynamics 
between them, for three main reasons: (1) there are multidimensional competitive dynamics among 
the major powers involved in the TPP and the RCEP; (2) competition among these players have 
(partly) led to competitive dynamics between the TPP and RCEP as well; and (3) the coinciding 
emergence of the TPP and the RCEP has made the regional economic integration process in the 
Asia-Pacific more complicated and divisive.  
 
5.5.2. Multidimensional competition  
 
Firstly, there is multidimensional competition among the major players involved in the TPP 
and RCEP, as shown in section IV. To reiterate, the proponents of “competitive regionalism” argue 
that competition – understood as the quest for relative advantage – is a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon comprising economic, political and legal elements. This paper agree with Franzese and 
Hays that the key transmission belt for diffusion lies in negative externalities, whereby the actions of 
one actor affect the marginal utilities of possible course of action for others, and therefore, the 
competitive mechanism creates the most powerful incentive to react to the prior actions of one’s 
competitive peers. 191  Furthermore, this paper agrees with Solis and Katada’s argument that 
externalities go beyond economics to include security-political and legal ramifications. Competition 
                                                 
190 Ibid.  
191 Robert J. Franzese and Jude C. Hays. "Interdependence in Comparative Politics Substance, Theory, Empirics, 
Substance", Comparative Political Studies 41 (2008): 742-780. 
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affects both developed and developing countries, small or large, as these countries compete with 
their peers to secure preferential access abroad for their internationalized business sectors, to gain 
regional status and to become more influential in defining the direction of the multilateral trading 
system. Therefore, there is no guarantee that governments will pursue coherent region-wide FTAs, 
as each country is influenced by a particular set of competitive pressures.192  
 
In particular, China, Japan and the US have competed with each other by proposing 
different models of regional integration, all of which reflect their respective economic, geopolitical 
and legal interests. In the latter half of the 2000s, China and Japan competed with each other to 
shape an East Asia-wide FTA. But the US changed both China and Japan’s strategies when it joined 
the TPP negotiations in late 2008. Japan, drawn to the potential economic and geopolitical benefits 
of the TPP and the possible counter that it could pose to China’s increasingly regional dominance, 
also announced its interest in the TPP in late 2010. The participation of the largest and third largest 
economies in the TPP accelerated China’s pursuit of its own regional FTA strategy, and explains 
why it agreed to break the deadlock with Japan over the East Asia-FTA proposal and pushed for the 
launch of the CJK FTA negotiations (seen as a pre-requisite to an East Asia-wide FTA). ASEAN, 
on the other hand, was also responding competitively to the US-led TPP (due to fears of losing 
ASEAN centrality in the regional economic integration process) when it proposed the RCEP. The 
RCEP was thus a joint competitive response largely initiated by ASEAN and supported by China, to 
counter the US-led TPP.  
 
5.5.3. The triggering power of pivotal states 
 
Extending their competitive diffusion theory, Solis and Katada argued in a recently 
published paper that Japan was a “pivotal state” that triggered the cascade of FTAs (i.e. the RCEP 
and the CJK FTA negotiations) after it joined the TPP.  A pivotal state is a state whose actions 
trigger a competitive adjustment by peer competitors that may change the viability of alternative tracks 
for trade integration. The authors argue that pivotal states unleash the power of diffusion by 
motivating increased competition in economic, political and legal spheres, as these actions tip the 
balance among players in all three spheres. Because of their high capability (i.e. sufficient economic 
power to impose significant externalities on others, political leverage or military power and an 
                                                 
192 Katada, Solis and Stallings, Competitive Regionalism, 14.  
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advanced legal system) and credibility (which hinges on their past record to overcome domestic 
opposition to trade liberalization and to be proactive in international trade negotiations), the US and 
China are two pivotal states whose trade policy undoubtedly impacts the FTA diffusion process.  
 
On the other hand, Japan is an “unlikely pivotal state” because it has significant market 
potential, but has had a very dysfunctional FTA trade policy in the last ten years.193 In other words, it 
has high latent capability but low credibility. But by signalling to join the TPP in 2010, Japan used 
the TPP as a commitment device to boost credibility in its trade policy. Japan’s unexpected move in 
turn raised the spectre of large economic, political and legal externalities among its trading partners, 
especially on China and ASEAN. This paper finds that this extension of the competitive regionalism 
theory explains the specific timing of the launch of the RCEP adequately. Both ASEAN and China 
were afraid that Japan would pursue the TPP at the expense of an East Asian FTA, and so moved 
quickly to push forward the East Asian track after Japan’s announcement.  
 
5.5.4. Geopolitical and legal motivations of participating countries  
 
Moreover, the competitive diffusion theory posits that different countries joined the TPP 
and the RCEP for different reasons. As Solis and Katada noted with regards to the conclusion of 
bilateral and plurilateral FTAs, smaller countries, such as Singapore and Chile, were largely interested 
in the TPP for economic reasons, whereas the larger countries were also motivated by geopolitical 
and legal considerations, in addition to economic considerations. As evident from section IV, the 
larger players were indeed concerned with the geopolitical and legal implications of the RCEP and 
the TPP.  
 
With regards to legal competition (i.e. competition over FTA rule-making), the major powers 
use the mega-regional trade agreements to accomplish two main goals: firstly, standard-setting, 
meaning using FTAs using new rules that can be incorporated more widely and perhaps eventually 
to become a multilateral standard. As shown in section IV, this goal has been openly declared by 
Japan and the US, as both hope that the high-standard TPP rules, especially on WTO-Plus issues 
                                                 
193  The quality of Japan’s FTAs is generally low because Japan chooses small economic partners and protects is 
uncompetitive sectors through exemptions and managed tariff liberalization schedules. Moreover, its FTA policy-making 
includes numerous veto players that have managed to block FTAs if these threaten to involve sensitive sectors like 
agriculture and manufacturing.  
 84
like behind-the-border regulation, will eventually influence, or even be integrated into the WTO 
rules. The second dynamic at work in the competition over FTA rule-making is lock-in – 
governments put forward more idiosyncratic rules that apply only to their FTA network and impose 
cost to countries that operate with different standards. This dynamic can be observed in the RCEP, 
as it is more exclusive than the TPP, and seeks greater flexibility for developing ASEAN countries. 
China and other developing Asian countries (e.g. India) might also prefer a regional FTA that 
requires policy concessions of sensitive areas such as investment, intellectual property rights, and 
agriculture.   
 
FTAs also help participating countries to achieve broader foreign policy goals, hence 
political competition among states is also reflected in the competitive dynamics of the RCEP and 
the TPP. The range of foreign policy goals in areas of political and security relations that states aim 
to achieve through FTAs is wide and very much contingent on the power resources available to each 
state. Hence, most of the literature on strategic FTAs makes a distinction between the strategies of 
large and small powers.194 Large powers have traditionally relied on the ‘gravitational pull’ of their 
economies to influence other states’ behaviour. This is shown in China’s FTA policy towards 
ASEAN and its smaller trading partners, like the ASEAN states, New Zealand and Chile. As noted 
in section IV, China made substantial agricultural concessions to ASEAN when negotiating the 
ACFTA, largely to win the “trust” of its Southeast Asian neighbours and assuage fears of the “China 
threat”. The fact that great powers enjoy large markets and frequently act as security guarantors for 
allied states enables them to use FTAs to consolidate their position as regional leaders. By dictating 
the terms of economic integration through FTAs, great powers can define the membership of 
regional blocs, the sequence of the integration movement and the availability of side payments. 
However, a bid of leadership in the regional integration process can generate a counter-response 
from other great power competitors with the ensuing development of alternative and/or 
overlapping FTA networks. This particular dynamic was observed between the China and Japan 
with regards to the East Asia-wide FTA and now, between China and the US (i.e. China-backed 
RCEP vs. US-led TPP). 
 
                                                 
194 B. Stallings and S.N. Katada, “Conclusion: Free Trade Agreements in a Competitive World”. In Competitive Regionalism, 
236-251.  
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As for smaller states, FTAs offer them the ability to hedge by seeking negotiations with 
various large powers, which neutralises the large powers’ influence. Also, smaller states can use 
FTAs to reinforce security ties with existing allies. For example, Japan and some ASEAN countries 
wanted to add India, Australia and New Zealand to the East Asia-wide FTA framework not just 
because of greater economic benefits, but also as leverage against China, who preferred the 
ASEAN+3 framework (which would that allowed China to maximize its influence while offering 
substantial economic benefits).  On the other hand, the TPP allowed US allies and friends like Japan, 
New Zealand and Singapore to strengthen their security linkages with the US. Finally, FTA 
diplomacy is useful to smaller trading nations to ‘punch above their weight’ by constituting 
themselves through the development of FTA networks, as seen in the examples of Chile, Mexico 
and ASEAN. ASEAN in particular, hoped to maintain ASEAN centrality in the regional integration 
process by tabling the RCEP. But more open ASEAN economies, like Singapore, which aspire to be 
regional FTA hubs, have also joined the TPP.  
 
5.5.5. Competing templates for regional economic integration  
 
 The multidimensional competition among the major players mentioned above has led to 
competitive and mutually stimulating dynamics between the TPP and the RCEP, as evidenced by the 
temporal sequencing of the two proposals. The rapid development of the East Asia track in the 
2000s – through the EAFTA and CEPEA proposals, and other initiatives like the ASEAN+3 and 
the East Asian Summit (EAS)195  – sparked active US engagement in the Asia-Pacific under the 
Obama administration. The US gave new momentum to the trans-Pacific “track” of regional 
integration by joining the TPP in late 2008, arguably to counterbalance the East Asia track of 
regional integration (i.e. to prevent the emergence of an East Asian trade bloc that excluded the US). 
From 2010 onward, the progress of the Asia-Pacific track has been stimulating the East Asia track 
(whereas the East Asia track largely stimulated the Asia-Pacific track in the 2000s). Instead of the 
two tracks taking turns in gaining momentum, developments in both the Asia-Pacific track and the 
East Asia track are picking up. The expansion of the TPP membership since 2008, together with the 
acceleration of the negotiations under US leadership, led the East Asian countries (in particular 
China, Japan and ASEAN) to react defensively by reaching a consensus on the RCEP.  
                                                 
195 The EAS initially excluded the US and Russia but Japan and India supported the inclusion of US and Russia. ASEAN 
formally invited the US and Russia to join the group from 2011 onwards.  
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Given the catalytic effect of the TPP on East Asia regional economic integration, Terada 
concludes that the “driving force of East Asia integration will not come from within the region” and 
“external pressure such as the progress of the TPP negotiations led by the US will play a vital 
role”.196 The slow progress of the East Asia track from the end of the 2000s stemmed from the 
diverse and conflicting interests among East Asian countries, and shows that a driving force to 
overcome such obstacles would likely not come from within the region, at least in the short term. 
Currently, both tracks are expected to accelerate each other’s progress through their mutual 
stimulation and competition.  
 
Moreover, as highlighted in section III, the TPP and the RCEP represent two fundamentally 
different visions for regional trade and integration. The TPP started out as a FTA initiative among 
small, relatively open economies (namely Singapore, Brunei, New Zealand and Chile), and included 
more “21st century” issues that were important to developed countries. The RCEP, on the other 
hand, started off as a consolidation project between ASEAN and its trading partners (i.e. to 
consolidate the ASEAN+1 FTAs), and allows for more flexibility for developing countries (like 
India and China). Pre-requisites for entering the TPP are too high for developing countries and the 
advanced issues are largely irrelevant to them. Similarly, developed countries may not be interested 
in joining the RCEP because of its (relatively) low quality – i.e. narrower and shallower coverage of 
issue compared to bilateral FTAs and the TPP. As such, the TPP and the RCEP are more 
competitive than complimentary due to their differing membership, agenda, prospective content and 
most importantly, different levels of ambition.   
 
This paper thus extends Solis and Katada’s competitive regionalism theory in explaining 
bilateral/pluritlateral FTA proliferation to explain the “diffusion” of mega-regional free trade 
agreements. Of course, there cannot be as many mega-regional FTAs as bilateral/plurilateral ones, 
since these mega-regional proposals are partly a response to, and an aggregation of, the overlapping 
web of smaller-scale FTAs. Nevertheless, there are obvious negative externalities for important 
trading countries in the region that do not join either of the agreements.  The US would lose market 
share and investment opportunities in important emerging markets like China and India if it did not 
                                                 
196Takashi Terada. "Becoming more like a normal regionalism?" In Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism, eds. Mark 
Beeson and Richard Stubbs (London: Routledge, 2012) 
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join the concluded RCEP, whereas the TPP would put some East Asian exporters at a disadvantage 
in the US and some Latin American markets.  
 
5.5.6. Asia-Pacific economic integration becomes increasingly complicated and divisive  
 
Solis and Katada hypothesized that if competition is the dominant force behind FTA diffusion, 
the recent FTA proliferation in the Asia-Pacific would work against the emergence of coherent 
regional integration projects. But if emulation prevails, then bilateral/plurilateral FTAs will be 
supportive of region-wide integration efforts. It does seem that the current state of the emerging 
Asia-Pacific trade architecture supports the competition hypothesis. As mentioned, the RCEP and 
the TPP are not converging towards each other (though convergence has been discussed among 
scholars)197, as differences between the two templates will be very difficult to reconcile. Moreover, 
there must be sufficient political will among the major players involved in each agreement – namely 
between the US and China –before there the two templates can be merged.  Given the lingering 
mutual mistrust (the Chinese leadership still views the US as its primary external threat and the US is 
wary of China’s growing regional and global influence and its own relative decline) and 
fundamentally different political systems (democratic US vs. state capitalist/communist China), it is 
unlikely that the US and China can overcome their political differences in the foreseeable future. Un 
sum, practically and politically, the probability of a convergence between the RCEP and the TPP is 
low in the short to medium term.  
 
In 2009, Solis and Katada observed that political rivalry among the large countries (namely 
China, Japan and the US) undermined unity in the Asia-Pacific through diplomatic as well as rule-
setting competition. They predicted that this dynamic and the prevalence of cross-regional FTAs 
pursued by the smaller countries would prevent the consolidation of coherent regional projects in 
both East Asia and Latin America. The authors’ predictions came true because not only are there a 
proliferation of competing bilateral and plurilateral FTAs, there are now two competing mega-
regional FTAs: the TPP and RCEP – that have further divided Asia-Pacific regionalism.  
  
                                                 
197  Peter A. Petri, Michael G. Plummer, and Fan Zhai. "The TPP, China and the FTAAP: The Case for 
Convergence." In New Directions in Asia-Pacific Economic Integration, eds. Guoqiang Tang and Peter A. Petri (Honolulu: 
East-West Center, 2014): 78-92.  
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APEC’s endorsement of both the TPP and the East Asian proposals (EAFTA/CEPEA and 
RCEP) in 2010 as possible pathways to the FTAAP further stimulated the competition between the 
TPP and the East Asian track (which eventually took the form of the RCEP). Both the RCEP and 
the TPP were now competing for first-mover advantage – in other words, to be concluded ahead of 
the other agreement. Scholars generally agree that the timing of the negotiations’ conclusion (in 
addition to their final templates) will determine the degree of influence each agreement has on the 
eventual trade architecture of the Asia-Pacific. If the TPP is completed first it will set a new and high 
standard for trade liberalization in the region, reducing the utility of the RCEP and leaving it with 
only one major selling point – the inclusion of China. Conversely, if the RCEP succeeds in unifying 
the ASEAN-Plus FTAs, many governments may be content with this outcome and have a reduced 
appetite for the ambitious but costly reform agenda that the TPP demands. With both negotiations 
targeting similar completion dates  (either mid or end 2015), these dynamics are indicative of a 
competitive “race to the finish” that will gather pace and intensity over this year. While it is certainly 
possible that both agreements could co-exist, the competitive dynamic means that there will be 
significant first-mover advantages for whichever proposal wins the race, and potentially 
insurmountable challenges for the “loser”.  
  
Beijing’s strong support for the FTAAP during the 2014 AEPC Summit heightened the 
already intense competition between the TPP and RCEP. APEC members reached a consensus on 
the “Beijing Roadmap for APEC” to push forward the FTAAP process (i.e. a bigger mega-regional 
FTA) and agreed that the FTAAP would build on existing regional initiatives, including the RCEP 
and the TPP. After the meeting, Obama praised China for focusing attention on APEC’s role in 
eventually achieving the FTAAP (first proposed in 2006), but also reiterated that the US priority was 
the smaller TPP.198  It seems that China is backing the trans-Pacific track, but still prioritises the East 
Asia track as a means to establish the long-term FTAAP. The author of this paper argues that 
China’s firm advocacy of the RCEP over the TPP has actually increased competition between the 
two tracks. First, by laying out a vision of an “Asia-Pacific dream”, Chinese Premier Xi Jinping has 
underscored China’s intention to enhance its regional and global influence. This can be interpreted 
as a pre-emptive move by China to take leadership of the Asia-Pacific integration initiative.   
 
5.5.7. Is competitive regionalism fundamentally a realist theory?  
                                                 
198 “APEC summit backs the Beijing roadmap to vast Asia-Pacific free trade area”, The Guardian, 11 November 2014.  
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Realists may argue that the competitive dynamics between the RCEP and the TPP essentially 
reflect the competitive dynamics between China and the US. This paper contends that the reality is 
not as simple as great power politics. The TPP and RCEP cannot be seen merely as tools for great 
power rivalry because they originate from broader regional and global trends (i.e. systemic factors 
like increasing trade liberalization and economic interdependence) and are also shaped by the 
strategies and actions of other states. After all, the TPP was not an initiative of the US, but of four 
small Pacific states, just as the RCEP was not an initiative of China, but of ASEAN. The fact that 
both sets of negotiations have dragged on, and the proposals by China and the US have met with 
opposition by other countries, clearly shows that the ability of the great powers to influence the 
eventual agreements is limited. Hence, the world of mega-regional trade agreements is more multi-
polar than bi-polar. One must note that states are also not necessarily forced to choose between the 
RCEP and the TPP – several states are participants in both agreements. Japan also has substantial 
influence on the regional trade integration initiatives, as evidenced by the cascade of reactions it 
provoked after signalling its interest in the TPP. The final templates of both FTA proposals have 
not yet been concluded, which leaves much to be said about how much each FTA will be influenced 
by the great powers.  That said, it is impossible to discount the influence of great powers on the 
FTA negotiations. So the theory advanced by this paper is more an integrative framework of 
institutional and realist perspectives.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
6.1. Summary of Findings   
 
 This paper seeks to explain the coinciding emergence of two mega-regional FTAs – the 
RCEP and the TPP – in the same region at around the same time. First, I posit that there is a 
competitive and mutually stimulating dynamic between the emergence of the two trade deals and 
also their subsequent negotiating processes. I set out to prove this by: (1) examining the origins and 
development of the two agreements; (2) highlighting their differences in objectives, membership, 
and prospective content; and (3) explaining the motivations and behaviour of the major players 
involved in either one or both of the agreements.  
 
Secondly, the paper attempts to find a theoretical framework that best explains the parallel 
and competitive progress of both agreements. I find that the most compelling theory is competitive 
regionalism, which argues that FTA diffusion occurs because of multi-dimensional competition 
between regional states. I argue in section II that this dynamic of competitive diffusion can trace its 
way back the competitive dynamic between the East Asia and trans-Pacific regional integration 
tracks, before either the TPP or RCEP was formulated. For example, Mahathir’s 1990 proposal of 
the exclusive East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) was strongly opposed by the US. During the 
1990s, the US also tried to pursue its vision trans-Pacific regionalism through APEC and the Early 
Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL) project. The failure of the EVSL – mainly due to Japanese 
opposition to the liberalization of sensitive domestic sectors – led to the stagnation of the trans-
Pacific track in the late 1990s. In the meantime, the 1997-98 Asian financial and increasing economic 
interdependence among East Asian states injected new life into the idea of East Asian regionalism, 
which eventually led to two differing proposals for a East Asian FTA led by China and Japan 
respectively (i.e. EAFTA and CEPEA). The late 2000s saw the revival of the trans-Pacific track with 
the launch and expansion of the TPP. The TPP can be seen a US-led response to East Asian 
regionalism that was picking up pace throughout the 2000s, whereas the RCEP, launched in 2011, 
was East Asia’s counter-response to the TPP.   
 
The theory of competitive regionalism also accounts for the multidimensional competition 
among the major players involved in either or both the TPP and RCEP, which in turn explains for 
the competitive dynamics between the two tracks. This theory also takes into consideration the 
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different competitive motivations of small and large powers. Finally, competitive regionalism 
explains why the current state of Asia-Pacific regional integration is so fragmented. The TPP and 
RCEP are now superimposed upon the existing tangle of intra-regional and cross-regional FTAs, 
and it is uncertain how the two tracks, progressing in parallel, will eventually evolve. Currently, the 
two tracks are still stimulating each other in a competitive manner, and this pattern of interaction 
will most likely continue before either deal is concluded.   
   
6.2. Theoretical Contributions  
 
This paper seeks to extend the theory of competitive regionalism in two ways, in order to 
better explain the evolution of both the TPP and the RCEP, and the interaction between them. 
Competitive regionalism was used by Solis and Katada to explain the proliferation of bilateral and 
plurilateral FTAs (e.g. ASEAN Plus FTAs) in the Asia-Pacific. This paper contributes to the existing 
theoretical research on regionalism by explaining the emergence of trade agreements of a different 
nature – namely mega-regional trade agreements – using this theory. It must be noted that the 
RCEP had not even been proposed at the time the theory was first advanced. 
 
Secondly, this paper demonstrates that competition existed among various regional 
integration initiatives in the Asia-Pacific even before the genesis of the TPP and the RCEP. I argue 
that the TPP and the RCEP are continued manifestations of the longstanding competitive dynamics 
between the Asia-Pacific and East Asia integration “tracks” since the 1990s, and also responses to 
new regional realities that emerged in the 2000s.  
 
Finally, this paper aims to integrate the realist and institutional perspectives in explaining the 
emergence of the TPP and RCEP. In the Asia-Pacific, the distribution of capabilities among 
politically and economically dominant countries or blocs (namely the US, China and to a lesser 
extent, ASEAN and Japan) has constituted the basic framework for international affairs. Therefore, 
the geopolitical interactions among involved parties are thus considered one of the most important 
variables that influence the process of institution building in the Asia-Pacific. However, while realist 
and liberal theories have made important contributions to the existing literature on FTAs, the 
development of mega-regional FTAs are arguably more complex because they involve more 
countries and have the potential for much greater economic impact and more significant strategic 
implications. By drawing from both liberal and realist strands, competitive regionalism best accounts 
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for the observations I made about the motivations of states in joining the TPP and/or the RCEP, as 
well the temporal sequencing and pattern of progress for the two trade initiatives. Importantly, 
competitive regionalism takes into account the influence of domestic interest groups and the role of 
national leadership in explaining the emergence of the RCEP and the TPP, as well as the 
competitive and mutually stimulating dynamics between them.  
 
In sum, the TPP and the RCEP are (prospective) institutions that developed from the 
interaction of the major players in the region, against the background of changing regional and 
global trends and events. However, the respective developmental trajectories of these regional 
institutions, in which countries are both embedded in and influence, also have an effect in 
influencing each other (i.e. institutions influence other institutions). In other words, states and 
regional institutions are mutually constitutive. State behaviour and interaction stimulate the 
development of institutions, but institutions can also stimulate other institutions and thus shape the 
actions and strategies of states involved in these other institutions. Essentially, the TPP and the 
RCEP are mutually stimulating and competitive regional integration projects that resulted from the 
partly competitive, partly converging policies of countries in the Asia-Pacific. 
 
6.3. Areas for further research  
 
Firstly, the theory of competitive regionalism can be further tested by observing the 
continued interaction between the TPP and the RCEP in the near future. It would be interesting to 
see if the competitive dynamic persists, and whether a more cooperative or complementary dynamic 
can develop as states change their strategic calculations regarding both or one of the tracks.  Future 
research can focus on the how the TPP and the RCEP will influence each other once one of the 
templates is concluded (assuming they are not concluded simultaneously), and also when both are 
finalized. For one, if the TPP negotiations succeed as promised, it will introduce a new set of 
standards for WTO Plus-style liberalization, thus dramatically transforming both the regional and 
global trade architectures, and potentially diminishing the potential value of the RCEP. Finally, this 
theory has shown how the TPP, and in particular Japan’s entry into the TPP, influenced the launch of 
negotiations on the stalled East Asian FTA. The theory can be extended to examine the extent to 
which the TPP and certain countries’ entry into it may influence the outcomes of the negotiations in 
these regional trade groupings as well.   
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